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UNDERCOVER POLICING, OVERSTATED CULPABILITY 
Eda Katharine Tinto† 
This Article examines the legal doctrine of “sentencing manipulation,” a 
claim, raised at the time of sentencing, in which the defendant argues that 
undercover police officers purposefully encouraged him to commit particular 
criminal conduct in order to expose him to a longer, and often mandatory, 
prison sentence. Currently, the claim of sentencing manipulation has no 
uniform definition or application and lacks a consistent animating theory. 
Based on traditional theories of punishment and the systemic interest in an 
accurate determination of a defendant’s criminal culpability, this Article 
argues that inducements, used by undercover officers and their agents to 
encourage the suspect to commit particular criminal conduct, should be the 
central focus of a reformed sentencing manipulation doctrine. The sentencing 
manipulation doctrine as currently conceived fails to recognize the potential 
and problematic impact of police inducements on an assessment of a 
defendant’s culpability. Moreover, current definitions of the claim reflect 
binary concerns of guilt versus innocence that, while perhaps appropriate for 
a claim made at trial, are inapposite for a claim made at the time of 
sentencing. In determining where to draw the line between police inducements 
that affect a defendant’s culpability and those that do not, this Article also 
suggests a new way to view police conduct—on a continuum ranging from 
conduct that “facilitated culpability” to conduct that “overstated culpability.” 
A reformed doctrine of sentencing manipulation, as proposed by this Article, 
appropriately directs courts’ focus to inducements used by the police that 
result in the overstatement of a defendant’s culpability, and to offense conduct 
that should therefore be removed from the sentencing calculus. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Undercover police operations are generally accepted as a necessary 
and important tool for crime prevention and control. Undercover 
officers, confidential informants, “sting” operations, and other covert 
techniques are commonplace aspects of modern day law enforcement.1 
In the context of undercover policing, police officers have virtually 
unfettered discretion to determine the type of undercover tactic used, 
the quantity of narcotics involved, the incentives given, and the words 
communicated to the suspect. These investigative choices allow law 
enforcement to structure and suggest various criminal offenses.2 
 1 See Elizabeth E. Joh, Breaking the Law to Enforce It: Undercover Police Participation in 
Crime, 62 STAN. L. REV. 155, 161 (2009); Gary T. Marx, Who Really Gets Stung? Some Issues 
Raised by the New Police Undercover Work, 28 CRIME & DELINQ. 165, 166–67 (1982) 
[hereinafter Marx, Who Really Gets Stung?]; Julius Wachtel, From Morals to Practice: Dilemmas 
of Control in Undercover Policing, 18 CRIME, L. & SOC. CHANGE 137, 145 (1992). 
 2 See Richard A. Leo & Jerome H. Skolnick, The Ethics of Deceptive Interrogation, 11 CRIM. 
JUST. ETHICS 3 (1992). 
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Moreover, in today’s world of sentencing guidelines and mandatory 
minimum sentences, these decisions also greatly impact the eventual 
sentencing of the targeted suspect. 
The legal doctrine of “sentencing manipulation” addresses the 
tactics used by undercover officers and their effect on the defendant’s 
sentence. Under current federal and state sentencing laws, law 
enforcement’s encouragement or suggestion of particular criminal 
conduct has a direct impact on, and in fact often mandates, a 
defendant’s ultimate sentence. For example, under federal law, a police 
officer’s decision to sell a particular quantity of narcotics will dictate the 
defendant’s minimum prison sentence.3 In the court-created claim of 
sentencing manipulation, the defendant requests a reduced sentence 
based on the argument that the police deliberately encouraged particular 
offense conduct for purposes of guaranteeing a long prison sentence.4 
The claim of sentencing manipulation, and the related claim of 
“sentencing entrapment,”5 is focused not on whether the defendant is 
legally guilty of the underlying conduct but rather on the extent to 
which the defendant should be sentenced on the basis of conduct that he 
alleges was improperly suggested by the police.6 
To illustrate, imagine the parties agree to the following factual 
scenario: a defendant and an undercover officer negotiate a drug buy in 
which the defendant purchases ten grams of heroin. At some point, the 
defendant also agrees to purchase a gun. At sentencing, the defendant 
faces an additional mandatory prison term due to his possession of the 
gun. The parties’ characterizations of the police conduct that led up to 
the purchase of the gun diverge. The defendant argues that he should 
not be sentenced for having a firearm because he believes the 
undercover officer unfairly encouraged him to possess it. The defendant 
requests instead to be sentenced solely on the basis of the narcotics 
involved. In contrast, the government’s arguments focus on the 
defendant’s willingness to commit the additional conduct (in this 
example, to possess the gun) and the legitimate goals of police 
investigation such as the interest in testing a suspect’s readiness to 
commit a more serious crime.7 As seen by this example, the claim of 
 3 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1(c) (2010) [hereinafter USSG]. 
 4 My discussion of the police conduct at issue in sentencing manipulation claims includes 
cases in which the police propose additional offense conduct that increases the sentence for an 
offense already underway, as well as cases in which the police suggest offense conduct that 
allows the charging of an additional substantive offense that carries a higher mandatory 
sentence. 
 5 See infra Part I.A–B (discussing the related doctrines of sentencing entrapment and 
imperfect entrapment, respectively). 
 6 For an exploration of the relationship between sentencing manipulation and the trial 
phase defense of entrapment, see infra Part I.A. 
 7 See infra Part II.B.2 (examining law enforcement motives). 
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sentencing manipulation acknowledges the factual guilt of the defendant 
yet posits that a lower sentence may be warranted due to police conduct. 
Although this defense claim may be unusual—and perhaps even of 
questionable legitimacy to some—sentencing manipulation is currently 
recognized as a valid claim in many federal and state jurisdictions. Since 
its inception in the early 1990s,8 the claim of sentencing manipulation 
has been addressed by all the federal circuits and by more than half of 
state jurisdictions.9 Nevertheless, the claim has no uniform definition or 
procedural treatment. State and federal courts are widely divergent in 
both their definitions of the claim and their application of it in 
practice.10 In addition, the claim of sentencing manipulation has 
received scant scholarly attention.11 
The doctrine of sentencing manipulation, together with the police 
conduct it addresses, warrants closer examination for several reasons. 
Most critically, under the doctrine as currently conceived, police officers 
are able to manipulate offenders’ conduct and their sentences to such an 
extent that some defendants are being sentenced to unjustified lengthy 
prison terms. By “unjustified” I mean not justified by an assessment of 
the defendant’s criminal culpability at sentencing. I use the term 
“culpability”—and will do so throughout this Article—to refer to a 
broad assessment of an offender’s degree of blameworthiness, 
traditionally viewed as part of the sentencing calculus.12 Such an 
 8 See infra Part I.A (discussing the historical background of the doctrine of sentencing 
manipulation). 
 9 See infra Part I.B. It is difficult to ascertain how often sentencing manipulation and its 
related claims are raised in federal and state courts. Sentencing arguments and subsequent 
decisions are often not published in briefs or decisions, particularly in state court. In addition, 
the possibility of a successful sentencing claim influences a defendant’s calculations in 
determining whether to accept a plea bargain or proceed to trial. It is impossible to know the 
number of plea bargains that are accepted in part due to the apparent lack of any judicial 
sentencing discretion (or viable claim of sentencing mitigation). 
 10 See infra Part I.B. 
 11 After some initial interest in sentencing manipulation and related claims in the mid-
1990s, mostly by student authors, there has been little recent scholarship. See, e.g., Andrew G. 
Deiss, Making the Crime Fit the Punishment: Pre-Arrest Sentence Manipulation by Investigators 
Under the Sentencing Guidelines, 1994 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 419 (1994); Jeffrey L. Fisher, When 
Discretion Leads to Distortion: Recognizing Pre-Arrest Sentence-Manipulation Claims Under the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2385 (1996); see also Rachel A. Harmon, The 
Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 761, 817 (2012) (calling for more scholarly attention to 
the regulation of police beyond ex post constitutional challenges); Joh, supra note 1, at 159–60 
(describing lack of legal scholarly attention to undercover policing). 
 12 See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 118 (5th ed. 2009) (describing 
historical broad meaning of “culpability” to suggest “a general notion of moral 
blameworthiness”); Douglas Husak, “Broad” Culpability and the Retributivist Dream, 9 OHIO 
ST. J. CRIM. L. 449, 459 (2012) (describing broad meaning of culpability as one which focuses on 
a more general sense of moral blameworthiness and allows blame “to be depicted in varying 
degrees”); see also Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030–31 (2010) (discussing 
appropriateness of juvenile sentencing in light of juveniles’ “moral culpability”); Monu Bedi, 
Blame it on the Government: A Justification for the Disparate Treatment of Departures Based on 
Cultural Ties, 38 CAP. U. L. REV. 789, 813–14 (2010) (discussing traditional judicial sentencing 
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assessment takes into account the circumstances of the offense and 
characteristics of the offender.13 
The doctrine of sentencing manipulation raises the fundamental 
underlying question of whether a defendant is fully culpable for all 
criminal conduct committed with the participation of an undercover 
officer.14 To return to our earlier illustration, suppose the defendant 
asserts that he is not as culpable for possessing the gun as the 
prototypical gun possessor because, in his case, the undercover officer 
aggressively persuaded him to take the gun and eventually offered it to 
him at a substantial financial discount. Without these police 
inducements, the defendant contends, he would not have accepted the 
gun. According to this argument, the addition of the mandatory prison 
term for the gun is unjustified due to the defendant’s lesser degree of 
culpability. From a systemic perspective, it is this potential consequence 
of an unmerited lengthy sentence that is the most troubling. Although a 
precise assessment of a defendant’s culpability should always be of 
concern to the criminal justice system, in this time of prison 
overcrowding and finance-driven criminal justice reform, it is necessary, 
now more than ever, to examine the relative culpability of defendants 
and whether the lengths of sentences are justified.15 
An examination of the sentencing manipulation doctrine is also 
warranted for two additional reasons—reasons which highlight the 
practical importance of the doctrine and the concerns raised by the 
doctrine as it currently stands. First, in the context of undercover 
policing cases, the creation of state and federal mandatory sentencing 
schemes has essentially shifted some sentencing discretion to the police 
function of assessing culpability or blameworthiness of the defendant). 
 13 It is a long-standing tenet of sentencing that “the punishment should fit the offender and 
not merely the crime.” Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229, 1240 (2011) (quoting Williams 
v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949)); see also id. (“For the determination of sentences, justice 
generally requires consideration of more than the particular acts by which the crime was 
committed and that there be taken into account the circumstances of the offense together with 
the character and propensities of the offender.” (quoting Penn. ex rel. Sullivan v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 
51, 55 (1937))); Memorandum from Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr. to All Federal 
Prosecutors (May 19, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/oip/holder-memo-charging-
sentencing.pdf (stating that unwanted sentencing disparities may result “from a failure to 
analyze carefully and distinguish the specific facts and circumstances of each particular case”). 
 14 I am not using the term “culpability” to signify only that the defendant had the mental 
state required by the criminal offense—for instance, that he did in fact knowingly possess the 
gun. See DRESSLER, supra note 12, at 118 (describing narrow view of culpability as one equated 
with the particular mens rea required by the definition of the offense). Instead, my use of the 
term “culpability” reflects a more nuanced appraisal of the degree of a defendant’s 
blameworthiness typically conducted by the judge at sentencing. 
 15 See ACLU, SMART REFORM IS POSSIBLE 17–52 (2011), available at http://www.aclu.org/
files/assets/smartreformispossible.pdf (detailing several states’ bipartisan efforts to reduce 
prison populations); Charlie Savage, Trend to Lighten Harsh Sentences Catches on in 
Conservative States, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2011, at A14 (reporting growing agreement between 
conservatives and liberals on need for sentencing reform). 
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and their agents.16 As one court noted, “a judicial function has 
effectively slipped, at least in some cases, not only to the realm of the 
prosecution but even further to that of the police.”17 Sentencing at the 
hands of law enforcement runs counter to its traditional placement with 
the judge, a placement still valued by the Supreme Court and Congress 
even in today’s age of determinate and mandatory sentencing.18 An 
accepted and uniform sentencing manipulation doctrine would enable 
judicial sentencing discretion when appropriate—that is, it would give 
judges the discretion to reduce a defendant’s sentence when that 
sentence was improperly “manipulated” by the police.19 
Second, the current state of the sentencing manipulation doctrine 
is a jumble of labels and definitions which lack any consistency in 
meaning or application. This doctrinal disarray is contrary to the 
systemic interest in avoiding sentencing disparities among similarly 
situated defendants.20 As the doctrine currently stands, there are 
unjustified national inconsistencies in defendants’ ability to argue for a 
fair and appropriate sentence and in judges’ ability to sentence 
accordingly. 
It is the concern for sentences that do not accurately reflect the 
degree of a defendant’s culpability that drives my analysis of the 
sentencing manipulation doctrine. A sentencing manipulation doctrine 
 16 The category of “mandatory sentencing schemes” encompasses both binding sentencing 
guidelines and statutory mandatory minimum sentences. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 
although no longer mandatory, remain recommended and are predominantly followed by 
lower courts. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 341 (2007) (holding that federal appellate 
courts may apply a presumption of reasonableness for within-Guidelines sentences); United 
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005) (noting that the Guidelines are advisory but must be 
consulted); Bedi, supra note 12, at 790 (documenting most circuit courts’ position that trial 
courts should consult the Guidelines as part of the sentencing process); see also Kate Stith, The 
Arc of the Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise of Discretion, 117 YALE L.J. 1420, 
1490 (2008) (stating that while judges have more discretion post-Booker, they still do not have 
nearly the discretion they had in the pre-Guidelines era). 
 17 United States v. Shepherd, 857 F. Supp. 105, 106 (D.D.C. 1994). 
 18 See Pepper, 131 S. Ct. at 1235 (reaffirming notion that judges have wide discretion when 
imposing sentences); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 390 (1989) (discussing the 
Sentencing Guidelines and Congress’s “strong feeling that sentencing has been and should 
remain primarily a judicial function” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Stith, supra note 16, 
at 1489 (stating that Booker and its progeny “explicitly affirm the important role of the 
sentencing judge” in determining the “justness of punishment”). 
 19 This of course raises the question, “When does such improper manipulation occur?” This 
question is the central inquiry of this Article. 
 20 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (2006) (highlighting “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence 
disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar 
conduct”); 28 U.S.C. § 994(f) (2006) (promoting the goal of “reducing unwarranted sentence 
disparities”); Albert W. Alschuler, Disparity: The Normative and Empirical Failure of the 
Federal Guidelines, 58 STAN. L. REV. 85, 95–96 (2005) (stating that one principle of federal 
sentencing reform was that the region of the country should not determine a criminal 
sentence). States also have an interest in reducing unwarranted sentencing disparities. See, e.g., 
ALA. CODE § 12-25-2(a)(2) (2012); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(a)(1) (West 2012) (expressing 
desire for “the elimination of disparity and the provision of uniformity of sentences”).  
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evaluated and reformulated in such light will necessarily address the 
other two concerns: it will provide a uniform doctrine for state and 
federal courts and it will permit judicial discretion in sentencing when 
and if it is necessary to allow a change in sentence to reflect a more 
accurate assessment of a defendant’s criminal culpability. 
In order to have analytical meaning as a sentencing mitigation 
doctrine, the claim of sentencing manipulation must focus on 
undercover police conduct that affects an assessment of the defendant’s 
culpability at sentencing. In other words, the doctrine should target 
undercover police conduct that results in the defendant committing 
offense conduct for which he is not fully culpable and which therefore 
should not be part of his sentence.21 Conversely, a suggested doctrine 
should not be concerned with police conduct that—although perhaps 
resulting in an increase in the defendant’s sentence—does not affect an 
assessment of the defendant’s culpability at sentencing.22 The link to a 
defendant’s culpability is the lens through which the sentencing 
manipulation doctrine and the underlying police conduct must be 
analyzed. 
In this Article, I argue that inducements, used by undercover 
officers and their agents to encourage the suspect to commit particular 
criminal conduct, should be the central focus of a reformed sentencing 
manipulation doctrine. An inducement may be defined as “persuasion 
which overcomes the defendant’s reluctance” to commit a crime.23 
Inducements range from aggressive verbal encouragement to offering 
below-market rate prices for contraband.24 Inducements also include 
temptations more favorable than similar real-world criminal 
opportunities.25 An evaluation of the extent and nature of the 
 21 Part III.B discusses types of police action that could potentially result in a defendant 
engaging in conduct for which he is not fully culpable. For justification of the idea that some 
police conduct can, and does, reduce a defendant’s culpability, see infra Part II.A. 
 22 See infra Part III.B for examples of types of cases in which the defendant is culpable for 
all the committed conduct regardless of police participation. 
 23 United States v. Simas, 937 F.2d 459, 462 (9th Cir. 1991) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (citing Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 441 (1932)). The Ninth Circuit also 
included “repeated and persistent solicitation” in its definition. Id. In my view, this type of 
solicitation is included in the description of “inducement” given above. Moreover, an action 
need not necessarily be repeated and persistent in order to qualify as an inducement. 
Inducements may evolve and increase over time. An inducement may also be a single offer or 
action. For instance, an officer may issue a threat of physical harm in order to pressure a 
reluctant suspect. 
 24 See Bennett L. Gershman, Entrapment, Shocked Consciences, and the Staged Arrest, 66 
MINN. L. REV. 567, 625 (1982) (listing various inducements noted in court decisions, including 
repeated requests, physical threats, and appeals to friendship and sympathy); Bruce Hay, Sting 
Operations, Undercover Agents, and Entrapment, 70 MO. L. REV. 387, 407 (2005). 
 25 In other words, temptations that are “too good to be true.” See Ronald J. Allen et al., 
Clarifying Entrapment, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 407, 415 (1999) (discussing inducements 
that “exceed real world market rates, which includes both financial and emotional markets”). 
Inducements also include structural inducements—inducements built into the initial criminal 
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inducements utilized by the police, and the defendant’s responses to 
those inducements, provides the critical nexus between an evaluation of 
police conduct and a nuanced assessment of a defendant’s culpability at 
sentencing.26 The sentencing manipulation doctrine as currently 
conceived fails to recognize the potential and problematic impact of 
police inducements on a determination of a defendant’s culpability and 
reflects binary concerns of guilt versus innocence that, while perhaps 
appropriate for a claim made at trial, are inapposite for a claim made at 
the time of sentencing. 
Part I of this Article begins with the historical background of the 
sentencing manipulation claim and explains its doctrinal roots in the 
trial phase claims of entrapment and outrageous government conduct.27 
Part I then reviews the current doctrinal mess of sentencing 
manipulation and sentencing entrapment claims in federal and state 
courts. 
Part II justifies the principles behind the sentencing manipulation 
doctrine as conceived by this Article, namely that the focus of the 
sentencing manipulation doctrine should be on the inducements used 
by law enforcement. I look to traditional theories of punishment to 
support the premise that a defendant excessively induced by the police 
to commit additional criminal conduct is in fact not fully culpable for 
that offense conduct. I also justify the underlying notion that 
inducements used by the police, as opposed to inducements from 
private individuals, are of particular concern to the criminal justice 
system. Grounded in these foundational principles, Part II then 
critiques the current definitions of sentencing manipulation and argues 
that vestiges of the trial phase claims erroneously remain entangled in 
the current doctrine. This Part examines how the current formulations 
fail to provide courts with an effective way to evaluate the impact of 
undercover police conduct on a defendant’s culpability. 
Part III proposes a reconceived doctrine of sentencing 
manipulation. I suggest a doctrinal inquiry that appropriately directs 
courts’ focus to police inducements that impact an assessment of a 
defendant’s culpability and consequently produce unjustified lengthy 
sentences. I then apply this proposed doctrine to the undercover police 
opportunity itself; for example, an initial offer of significantly more money for an amount of 
drugs than would typically be proposed in the real-world or presenting a criminal opportunity 
in which the dangers are significantly minimized. 
 26 As I later explain in more depth, the evaluation is from the point of view of the defendant 
and does not simply hinge on whether inducements were in fact used by the police. Rather, the 
inquiry focuses on the interaction between the defendant and the police and the defendant’s 
responses to the police inducements used. See infra Part II.B. 
 27 I use the term “trial phase doctrines” to refer to claims and defenses raised at the time of 
trial or pretrial that focus on the guilt (or non-guilt) of the defendant, and may result in an 
acquittal or the dismissal of the case. By contrast, a sentencing claim is raised at the time of 
sentencing, and thus necessarily assumes the legal guilt of the defendant. 
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conduct at issue in these claims. In determining where to draw the line 
between police actions that affect an assessment of a defendant’s 
culpability and those that do not, I propose viewing police conduct on a 
continuum ranging from police conduct that merely “facilitated 
culpability” to conduct that results in the “overstated culpability” of the 
defendant.28 I posit that inducements may be used to such an extent that 
the culpability of the defendant is, in effect, “overstated” and, as a result, 
the defendant is sentenced to an unjustified lengthy prison sentence. My 
proposed doctrine of sentencing manipulation appropriately focuses on 
the use of police inducements that result in “overstated culpability” and 
in offense conduct which therefore should be removed from the 
sentencing calculus. 
I.     THE SENTENCING MANIPULATION DOCTRINE 
Before exploring the development of a normative sentencing 
manipulation doctrine, it is helpful to have an understanding of the 
claim’s doctrinal and historical underpinnings, as well as a clear picture 
of the current state of the doctrine. Recognizing the historical roots of 
the doctrine helps explain, but I later argue does not justify, the aspects 
of the trial phase doctrines that remain in current versions of the 
sentencing manipulation claim. 
A.     The Doctrinal and Historical Underpinnings 
Sentencing manipulation and the related claim of “sentencing 
entrapment”29 are court-created doctrines that have their roots in the 
trial phase doctrines of entrapment and outrageous government 
misconduct. I will first discuss both trial phase doctrines and then 
review the development of the related claims at sentencing. 
As is well-explored in scholarly literature, entrapment is a defense 
raised at trial that focuses on the question of whether the government 
encouraged a suspect to commit a crime he otherwise would not have, 
absent the police participation.30 Most jurisdictions employ a 
“subjective” formulation of the defense in which the defendant must 
demonstrate that he or she was overcome by excessive governmental 
 28 See infra Part III (defining terms). 
 29 See infra text accompanying notes 47–48 (defining sentencing manipulation and 
sentencing entrapment). 
 30 See generally PAUL MARCUS, THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE (4th ed. 2009); Allen et al., 
supra note 25; Fred Warren Bennett, From Sorrells to Jacobson: Reflections on Six Decades of 
Entrapment Law, and Related Defenses, in Federal Court, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 829 (1992). 
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inducements and had no predisposition to commit the crime.31 A 
minority of jurisdictions use an “objective” test, which asks whether the 
government actions were sufficient to induce an average, law-abiding 
person to commit the crime.32 While the objective approach does not 
require a finding that the defendant lacked the predisposition to commit 
the crime, and therefore arguably maintains a focus on government 
conduct, both versions of the entrapment defense are based on the 
reactions of an “innocent” person, whether a reasonably objective 
person or the one actually charged with the crime.33 Under both 
approaches, the entrapment defense is a complete defense; if accepted 
by the judge or jury, the defendant is found not guilty.34 
“Outrageous government conduct” is a second trial phase claim, 
raised by pretrial motion, which focuses on the actions of law 
enforcement.35 This due process-based doctrine applies only when the 
police conduct is “so outrageous that due process principles would 
absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial processes to 
obtain a conviction.”36 Thus, the standard for police actions that 
warrant a dismissal of the charges is very high—the government 
conduct must be “so grossly shocking and so outrageous as to violate the 
universal sense of justice.”37 The Supreme Court, although suggesting in 
dicta that such misconduct might theoretically exist, has never explicitly 
found so on the facts before it.38 Similarly, most federal courts, when 
 31 See Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 553–54 (1992); Sherman v. United States, 356 
U.S. 369, 372 (1958); SANFORD H. KADISH ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 626 (8th 
ed. 2007). 
 32 See KADISH ET AL., supra note 31, at 626. About a half-dozen states follow a “hybrid” 
approach. MARC L. MILLER & RONALD F. WRIGHT, CRIMINAL PROCEDURES 719 (4th ed. 2011). 
 33 See Allen et al., supra note 25, at 409, 412 (arguing that whether a subjective or objective 
test is used is irrelevant as the outcome will almost always be the same); Hay, supra note 24, at 
400–01 (stating that the subjective entrapment test looks at the defendant’s predisposition 
whereas the objective test looks at a hypothetical non-predisposed person). Each test is based 
on the perceptions of either the defendant or a person in the position of the defendant; neither 
considers the subjective intent of the police. 
 34 The entrapment defense is rarely successful. MILLER & WRIGHT, supra note 32, at 1395. 
This is often due to a defendant being unable to show that he was not predisposed to commit 
the crime. Richard H. McAdams, The Political Economy of Entrapment, 96 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 107, 117 (2005). 
 35 Although often referred to as a “defense,” the claim of outrageous government conduct is 
technically a bar to prosecution. See People v. Wesley, 274 Cal. Rptr. 326, 329 (Ct. App. 2002). 
The defense raises the claim before the judge, who would dismiss the pending charges if the 
motion is granted. Id. 
 36 United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431–32 (1973); see also United States v. 
Ciszkowski, 492 F.3d 1264, 1270 (11th Cir. 2007); United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373, 380–82 
(3d Cir. 1978). 
 37 United States v. Garza-Juarez, 992 F.2d 896, 904 (9th Cir. 1993) (internal quotations 
omitted) (defining such conduct as “so excessive, flagrant, scandalous, intolerable and 
offensive”). 
 38 See Russell, 411 U.S. at 431–32. In Hampton v. United States, a plurality of the Court 
rejected the idea of a due-process–based police misconduct claim. 425 U.S. 484, 490 (1976) 
(plurality opinion). Two Justices in concurrence and three Justices in dissent, however, 
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faced with such a claim, have declined to find the government conduct 
at issue sufficiently “outrageous” to justify a dismissal of the 
indictment.39 
It is in these two trial phase doctrines that the claim of sentencing 
manipulation has its doctrinal origins. Its historical roots lie in the 
creation of mandatory sentencing schemes and the corresponding 
restriction of judicial discretion in sentencing. 
With the advent of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in 1987, and 
the rise of statutory mandatory minimum sentences in state and federal 
law throughout the 1980s and 90s, judicial sentencing discretion became 
increasingly constrained.40 Judges were required to sentence defendants 
to mandatory prison terms based on the type of offense and to increase 
the length of a sentence based on various aspects of the underlying 
conduct and the defendant’s criminal history.41 Criminal sentencing 
moved from the ambit of unstructured discretion to a structured and 
mandatory calculation based on the particulars of the crime, such as the 
quantity of drugs, the existence of firearms, or the role of the defendant 
in the crime.42 This approach to sentencing, while well-recognized as 
reducing judicial discretion and increasing the impact of prosecutorial 
discretion in charging decisions,43 significantly changed the import of 
law enforcement discretion as well, particularly in the world of 
undercover policing. 
The creation of mandatory sentencing laws placed enormous 
additional power in the hands of the police—namely, the opportunity to 
maintained that an outrageous government conduct claim would potentially be available to a 
predisposed defendant. Id. at 495 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 497 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 39 See United States v. Walls, 70 F.3d 1323, 1329–30 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (discussing lack of 
support for outrageous conduct claim throughout the circuits); MILLER & WRIGHT, supra note 
32, at 722 (stating that although most state and federal courts recognize the claim, it rarely 
succeeds); see also, e.g., United States v. Kelly, 707 F.2d 1460, 1461 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (reversing 
district court’s finding of outrageous government conduct); United States v. Cromitie, 781 F. 
Supp. 2d 211, 227–28 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (denying defendants’ outrageous government conduct 
claim related to terrorism investigation).  
 40 Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging the Jury: The Criminal Jury's Constitutional Role in an Era 
of Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 33, 34–35 (2003); William W. Wilkins, Jr. et al., 
Competing Sentencing Policies in a "War on Drugs" Era, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 305, 309–11 
(1993); see also Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 390 (1989) (describing previous 
sentencing system as giving judges “wide discretion to determine the appropriate sentence in 
individual cases”). 
 41 See USSG ch. 1, pt. A, subpt. 1.4(a) (detailing “real offense” sentencing structure); 
Wilkins et al., supra note 40, at 311–12. 
 42 See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 368 (stating that Sentencing Reform Act was “meant to 
establish a range of determinate sentences for categories of offenses and defendants according 
to various specified factors”); USSG § 2D1.1(c) (establishing base sentencing levels depending 
on the quantity of drugs); id. § 2D1.1(b)(1) (increasing sentence length if a firearm was 
possessed); id. § 3B1.1–1.2 (adjusting sentence based on the role of the defendant). 
 43 See Alschuler, supra note 20, at 102; Marc L. Miller, Domination & Dissatisfaction: 
Prosecutors as Sentencers, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1211, 1252 (2004); Symposium, Conference on the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Summary of Proceedings, 101 YALE L.J. 2053, 2066–68 (1992). 
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make strategic decisions during an undercover operation that would, in 
many cases, mandate and dramatically increase a suspect’s ultimate 
sentence. For example, if a defendant bought a handgun and narcotics 
from an undercover officer, the defendant would potentially face a 
mandatory minimum sentence of five years; whereas if the police 
specifically provided a machine gun, the judge would then be required 
by law to sentence the defendant to an additional twenty-five years in 
prison.44 Thus, the actions of undercover officers now had the potential 
to directly limit much of the remaining judicial sentencing discretion. 
Once the impact of police tactical choices due to mandatory 
sentencing laws became evident, some courts began to acknowledge the 
possibility that government actions “even if insufficiently oppressive to 
support an entrapment defense . . . or due process claim” may still 
warrant a reduction in the sentence of a defendant.45 The claim of 
sentencing manipulation and the related claim of sentencing 
entrapment arose from this recognition.46 
The claim of “sentencing manipulation,” also sometimes referred 
to as “sentence factor manipulation,” parallels the trial phase claim of 
outrageous government conduct, maintaining, in theory, a primary 
focus on the actions of the police or government agents rather than on 
the defendant’s prior willingness to commit such a crime.47 “Sentencing 
entrapment,” although similarly lacking in doctrinal clarity, is generally 
defined as occurring when the government pressures a suspect “initially 
predisposed to commit a lesser crime to commit a more serious 
offense.”48 Like the trial defense of entrapment, sentencing entrapment 
retains a focus on the predisposition of the defendant.49 In both 
sentencing manipulation and sentencing entrapment claims, instead of 
asking for the entire case to be dismissed, a defendant requests that 
certain offense conduct be “filtered out of the sentencing calculus.”50 
 44 See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2006); see also infra notes 172–173 (discussing United States v. 
Cannon, 886 F. Supp. 705 (D.N.D. 1995), rev’d, 88 F.3d 1495 (8th Cir. 1996)). 
 45 United States v. Connell, 960 F.2d 191, 194 (1st Cir. 1992). 
 46 See Marcia G. Shein, Sentencing Manipulation and Entrapment, 10 CRIM. JUST. 25, 25–28 
(1995) (discussing development of sentencing entrapment claim); Amy Levin Weil, In Partial 
Defense of Sentencing Entrapment, 7 FED. SENT’G REP. 172, 173 (1995) (discussing circuits’ early 
treatment of sentencing manipulation claims). 
 47 To some extent, the claim of sentencing manipulation parallels the “objective” 
formulation of the entrapment defense. See Dru Stevenson, Entrapment by Numbers, 16 U. FLA. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 42 (2005). However, as discussed above, the objective test still involves 
consideration of an “innocent” whereas a sentencing manipulation claim does not do so, at 
least not explicitly. See infra Part II.B (critiquing predisposition as a component of sentencing 
manipulation). 
 48 United States v. Turner, 569 F.3d 637, 641 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing United States v. Garcia, 
79 F.3d 74, 75 (7th Cir. 1996)). 
 49 See United States v. Searcy, 233 F.3d 1096, 1099, 1101 (8th Cir. 2000); People v. Smith, 80 
P.3d 662, 667 (Cal. 2003). 
 50 See United States v. Ciszkowski, 492 F.3d 1264, 1270 (11th Cir. 2007); see also infra note 
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B.     The Current State of the Doctrine 
Federal and state courts are widely divergent in their acceptance of 
the claim of sentencing manipulation as well as how the doctrine is 
defined and applied. In fact, any attempt to summarize the current state 
of the doctrine necessarily oversimplifies the confusion. In some 
jurisdictions, the claims of sentencing manipulation and sentencing 
entrapment are defined differently but in others the labels are used 
interchangeably.51 
There is no singular definition of what constitutes “sentencing 
manipulation.” Generally speaking, courts are divided between 
exceptionally broad definitions and definitions narrow in their 
application. For example, the Seventh Circuit expansively defines 
sentencing manipulation as “when the government engages in improper 
conduct that has the effect of increasing a defendant’s sentence.”52 By 
contrast, the Eighth Circuit circumscribes the definition with respect to 
the factual circumstances to which it applies: “Sentencing manipulation 
occurs when the government unfairly exaggerates the defendant’s 
sentencing range by engaging in longer-than-needed investigation and, 
thus, increasing the drug quantities for which the defendant is 
responsible.”53 These distinct definitions also play a role in a court’s 
acceptance or rejection of the claim itself. The Ninth Circuit, for 
instance, rejects the doctrine of sentencing manipulation as defined as a 
claim seeking a sentence reduction based solely on the government’s 
decision to delay the arrest and investigate further.54 
Given the many names and definitions of the sentencing 
manipulation claim, it is difficult to ascertain the general acceptance of 
143 (discussing how such filtering may occur). 
 51 For example, the First, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits use different labels interchangeably. See 
United States v. Beltran, 571 F.3d 1013, 1018 (10th Cir. 2009) (stating that the Tenth Circuit 
analyzes “claims of sentencing entrapment or manipulation under the rubric of ‘outrageous 
governmental conduct’” (citing United States v. Lacey, 86 F.3d 956, 963 (10th Cir. 1996)); 
United States v. Riewe, 165 F.3d 727, 729 (9th Cir. 1999) (recognizing a single claim entitled 
either “sentencing entrapment” or “sentence factor manipulation”); United States v. Gibbens, 
25 F.3d 28, 30 (1st Cir. 1994) (“The doctrine of sentencing factor manipulation is a kissing 
cousin of the doctrine of entrapment.”); United States v. Medel, No. CR 10-1738GB, 2011 WL 
5223013, at *4 (D.N.M. Oct. 25, 2011) (“Sentencing-factor manipulation, [is] also called 
sentencing entrapment . . . .”). 
 52 Garcia, 79 F.3d at 75; see also United States v. Gagliardi, 506 F.3d 140, 148 (2d Cir. 2007). 
The use of the word “improper” arguably narrows the scope of the definition, but as discussed 
infra Part II, it is not clear what “improper” actually means in this context. Is the police conduct 
improper because it results in an increased sentence? Is it improper because it increases the 
sentence in a way that seems unjust or unfair? Or is it improper based on some independent 
assessment of what the police should or should not do? The use of “improper” as a qualifier 
does not, on its own, say enough about how to view the underlying police conduct of a 
sentencing manipulation claim. 
 53 United States v. Torres, 563 F.3d 731, 734 (8th Cir. 2009). 
 54 See United States v. Baker, 63 F.3d 1478, 1500 (9th Cir. 1995). 
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the doctrine. On their face, the First, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh 
Circuits recognize a claim of sentencing manipulation.55 The Eighth 
Circuit also recognizes a separate claim of sentencing entrapment but 
the Eleventh Circuit does not.56 The First and Tenth Circuits recognize a 
single doctrine, which is interchangeably labeled sentencing 
manipulation or sentencing entrapment.57 The Seventh and Ninth 
Circuits ostensibly reject the doctrine of sentencing manipulation, but 
do so using different definitions of the claim.58 Both circuits, however, 
allow claims of sentencing entrapment.59 The Second, Third, Fourth, 
Fifth, and Sixth Circuits have declined to recognize either sentencing 
claim due to their failure to find the factual circumstances upon which 
the defendant would prevail on such a claim.60 The D.C. Circuit has 
suggested that it does not accept either doctrine.61 In addition, the 
Second and Ninth Circuits, albeit circuits that do not recognize the 
doctrine of sentencing manipulation per se, do recognize a sentencing 
claim of “imperfect entrapment,” a claim in which the defendant seeks a 
reduction in sentence based on government conduct that “does not give 
rise to an entrapment defense but that is nonetheless aggressive 
encouragement of wrongdoing.”62 State courts are similarly varied in 
 55 See Beltran, 571 F.3d at 1018–19; Torres, 563 F.3d at 734; Ciszkowski, 492 F.3d at 1270; 
United States v. Montoya, 62 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1995). 
 56 See Ciszkowski, 492 F.3d at 1270 (stating that “our Circuit does not recognize sentencing 
entrapment as a viable defense”); United States v. Searcy, 233 F.3d 1096, 1099 (8th Cir. 2000) 
(recognizing sentencing entrapment as a doctrine). 
 57 See United States v. Jaco-Nazario, 521 F.3d 50, 57 (1st Cir. 2008) (“We have used the 
terms ‘sentencing entrapment’ and ‘sentencing factor manipulation’ interchangeably.”); see also 
supra note 51. 
 58 See United States v. Garcia, 79 F.3d 74, 76 (7th Cir. 1996) (“We now hold that there is no 
defense of sentencing manipulation in this circuit.”); see also supra text accompanying note 52 
(defining the claim in the Seventh Circuit); supra text accompanying note 54 (stating the Ninth 
Circuit’s definition). 
 59 United States v. Turner, 569 F.3d 637, 641 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. Riewe, 165 
F.3d 727, 729 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 60 See United States v. Floyd, 375 F. App’x 88, 89 (2d Cir. 2010) (noting that the court has 
not accepted either theory as a ground for sentence reductions); United States v. Sed, 601 F.3d 
224, 229 (3d Cir. 2010) (“We have neither adopted nor rejected the doctrines of sentencing 
entrapment and sentencing factor manipulation.”); United States v. Guest, 564 F.3d 777, 781 
(6th Cir. 2009) (stating that the Sixth Circuit generally does not recognize either sentencing 
entrapment or sentencing manipulation); United States v. Tremelling, 43 F.3d 148, 151 (5th 
Cir. 1995) (stating that the Circuit has not expressly determined whether it accepts the concept 
of “sentencing factor manipulation”); United States v. Jones, 18 F.3d 1145, 1154 (4th Cir. 1994) 
(stating that the court has not yet accepted the legal viability of sentencing manipulation or 
sentencing entrapment but has never had to do so on the facts before it). 
 61 See United States v. Hinds, 329 F.3d 184, 188 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
 62 United States v. Bala, 236 F.3d 87, 92 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Both circuits find the authority for such departures in section 5K2.12 of the USSG. Bala, 236 
F.3d at 92; United States v. Garza-Juarez, 992 F.2d 896, 912 (9th Cir. 1993); USSG § 5K2.12 
(2010) (allowing downward departure based on coercion or duress). One district court in the 
First Circuit has also granted a downward departure based on the claim of imperfect 
entrapment. See United States v. Oliveira, 798 F. Supp. 2d 319, 322, 325 (D. Mass. 2011) (citing 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2016362
TINTO.34.4 (Do Not Delete) 4/19/2013 12:05 PM
2013] U N D E R CO V E R  PO L I C I N G 1415
their acceptance of the sentencing entrapment and manipulation 
doctrines.63 
In addition, there are differences in how the various definitions 
function when applied to defendants’ claims. In determining what 
police conduct qualifies as “manipulative,” some courts require the 
conduct to be sufficiently “outrageous” so as to meet the due process 
standard of outrageous government conduct.64 Other courts suggest a 
less severe standard of police misconduct (though admittedly still a high 
bar), using descriptors such as “extraordinary,”65 “overbearing and 
outrageous,”66 and “extreme and unusual.”67 Significantly, no court 
gives further explanation as to what type of police conduct qualifies as 
extraordinary or extreme, nor provides an underlying justification for 
the “amount” of misconduct required. 
A second variable is the consideration of the subjective police 
motive. Some courts require an “improper” motive on the part of the 
police.68 Several courts go even further and hold that an improper 
government motive is necessary but not alone sufficient to prevail on a 
sentencing manipulation claim.69 In contrast, other jurisdictions either 
Second and Ninth Circuit case law). 
 63 See, e.g., State v. Monaco, 83 P.3d 553, 557 (Ariz. 2004) (holding that Arizona does not 
recognize either sentencing entrapment or manipulation); People v. Smith, 80 P.3d 662, 665 
(Cal. 2003) (rejecting sentencing entrapment doctrine and declining to decide whether 
California recognized sentencing manipulation doctrine); People v. Claypool, 684 N.W.2d 278, 
280 (Mich. 2004) (rejecting sentencing entrapment or manipulation per se but holding that 
police conduct which alters a defendant’s intent can be a basis for a downward departure); 
Commonwealth v. Petzold, 701 A.2d 1363, 1366 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) (recognizing a doctrine 
blending sentencing entrapment and manipulation). 
 64 See, e.g., Sed, 601 F.3d at 231 (discussing defendant’s sentencing manipulation claim and 
stating that the police conduct was not “sufficiently outrageous to violate the Due Process 
Clause”); United States v. Beltran, 571 F.3d 1013, 1018 (10th Cir. 2009) (stating that the Tenth 
Circuit analyzes “claims of sentencing entrapment or manipulation under the rubric of 
‘outrageous governmental conduct’”); United States v. Gagliardi, 506 F.3d 140, 148 (2d Cir. 
2007) (noting that a showing of outrageous government conduct is likely an element of 
sentencing manipulation). 
 65 United States v. Ciszkowski, 492 F.3d 1264, 1271 (11th Cir. 2007). 
 66 United States v. Tremelling, 43 F.3d 148, 151 (5th Cir. 1995). 
 67 United States v. Fontes, 415 F.3d 174, 180 (1st Cir. 2005). 
 68 See, e.g., United States v. Shephard, 4 F.3d 647, 649 (8th Cir. 1993) (stating that defendant 
failed to show that the police conduct was “for the sole purpose of ratcheting up a sentence”); 
State v. Soto, 562 N.W.2d 299, 305 (Minn. 1997) (stating that for a successful claim of 
sentencing manipulation, defendant must demonstrate that law enforcement’s actions were 
solely motivated by an intent to increase defendant’s sentence rather than other legitimate 
investigatory purposes). The requirement of an improper motive is also implicitly included in 
many of the standards of misconduct. See, e.g., United States v. Cannon, 886 F. Supp. 705, 708 
(D.N.D. 1995) (“The test of sentencing manipulation is whether the government conduct was 
outrageous and aimed only at increasing the sentence, or whether it served some legitimate law 
enforcement objective.”), rev’d on other grounds, 88 F.3d 1495 (8th Cir. 1996). 
 69 See, e.g., Fontes, 415 F.3d at 179–81 (finding no sentencing manipulation even though 
government agent admitted that he switched to crack cocaine versus powder cocaine in 
narcotics transaction in part to get a higher sentence); United States v. Glover, 153 F.3d 749, 
756 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (stating that even if police had chosen a school zone location to increase 
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do not require an improper motive or omit a discussion of motive when 
applying the sentencing manipulation doctrine.70 
A third functional difference in the application of the sentencing 
manipulation claim is the consideration of the defendant’s 
predisposition to commit the offense conduct.71 While theoretically only 
a consideration of the claim most commonly labeled “sentencing 
entrapment,” some courts also consider a defendant’s predisposition 
when deciding claims of “sentencing manipulation.”72 On the other 
hand, some courts affirmatively rule out the consideration of 
predisposition in sentencing manipulation claims.73 
One or more of these three components—a requisite amount of 
police misconduct, the “legitimacy” of the police motive, and the 
predisposition of the defendant—arises either explicitly or implicitly in 
the sentencing manipulation claim as currently applied.74 These 
elements are contained in some courts’ accepted definitions of the claim 
yet are also found in the definitions of jurisdictions that have never 
found before them the facts justifying its application.75 
More generally, a consistent animating theory underlying the 
sentencing manipulation claim and its application is missing from 
current doctrinal definitions. In order to engage in a meaningful 
critique of the current doctrine, it is necessary to first have an 
independent understanding of a normative theory justifying the claim. 
defendant’s sentence, that is insufficient for defendant to prevail); United States v. Shepherd, 
102 F.3d 558, 168–69 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (reversing the district court’s downward departure based 
on sentencing manipulation, despite the court’s finding that the government agent switched to 
crack cocaine only to increase the defendant’s sentence), rev’g 857 F. Supp. 105 (D.D.C. 1994); 
United States v. Walls, 70 F.3d 1323, 1329 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (finding no sentencing entrapment 
despite the undercover agent’s testimony that he insisted on dealing in crack cocaine rather 
than powder in order to “get any target over the mandatory ten years”). 
 70 See, e.g., United States v. Lora, 129 F. Supp. 2d 77, 90 (D. Mass. 2001) (noting that 
downward departure due to price manipulation by the government focuses on government 
conduct regardless of motive). 
 71 See infra text accompanying note 123 (defining legal term). 
 72 See United States v. DePierre, 599 F.3d 25, 29 (1st Cir. 2010) (noting that predisposition 
sometimes comes into courts’ consideration and rejection of sentencing manipulation claims); 
see also, e.g., United States v. Lacey, 86 F.3d 956, 966 (10th Cir. 1996) (evaluating defendant’s 
sentencing manipulation claim but concluding that government conduct was not so egregious 
as to overcome the will of the defendant predisposed only to committing lesser crimes); United 
States v. Brewster, 1 F.3d 51, 55 (1st Cir. 1993) (defining a sentencing factor manipulation 
claim, in part, as government conduct which “overbear[s] the will of a person predisposed only 
to committing a lesser crime” (quoting United States v. Connell, 960 F.2d 191, 196 (1st Cir. 
1992)). 
 73 See, e.g., United States v. Shephard, 4 F.3d 647, 649 (8th Cir. 1993) (stating that 
sentencing manipulation claim focuses on government agents’ conduct and not defendants’ 
predisposition). 
 74 See infra Part II.B. (critiquing these three aspects of the sentencing manipulation 
doctrine). 
 75 See, e.g., United States v. Docampo, 573 F.3d 1091, 1097–98 (11th Cir. 2009) (stating that 
the Eleventh Circuit has not yet accepted the doctrine of sentencing manipulation as it has 
never found “extraordinary misconduct”). 
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Therefore, in the next Part, I explore the theoretical foundation of 
sentencing manipulation and suggest a theory grounded in notions of 
proportionality, culpability, and a defendant’s volition to commit a 
crime. 
II.     A CRITIQUE OF THE SENTENCING MANIPULATION DOCTRINE 
The underlying premise of the sentencing manipulation doctrine as 
proposed here is the idea that an evaluation of a defendant’s culpability 
is critically linked to an evaluation of the inducements used by the 
police and their agents. Two main principles explain this linkage. First, 
all other things being equal, an induced defendant is less culpable than a 
non-induced defendant.76 Second, government inducements, 
specifically police inducements, are of particular concern to criminal 
law and the criminal justice system. In this Part, I attempt to justify both 
underlying principles. Justifying a reduction in sentence is not the 
analytical equivalent of concluding that a defendant does not deserve 
punishment.77 The question is not whether the underlying criminal 
conviction is lawful, but rather whether there is reason to reduce the 
sentence due to the inducements used by undercover police or their 
agents. It is possible, of course, to simply decide that a defendant is 
always culpable for all conduct he committed.78 I argue, however, that 
theoretical rationales of punishment, as well as systemic interests of the 
criminal justice system, justify both a sentencing manipulation doctrine 
focused on inducements and a reduction in sentence for some police-
induced conduct. 
A.     Sentencing Manipulation Justified 
The foundational premise that induced defendants should be 
sentenced less severely than non-induced defendants is consistent with 
theoretical justifications of punishment and sentencing. Punishment 
that is proportional to an evaluation of an offender’s blameworthiness 
 76 I recognize that not every “induced defendant” is the same nor has a similar degree of 
decreased culpability. As explored in detail in Part III, it is the type and extent of inducements 
used and the defendant’s interactions with those inducements that determine whether there is 
an impact—and how much of an impact—on an assessment of the defendant’s culpability. For 
simplicity’s sake, however, I will proceed with this next discussion by generally contrasting 
induced defendants with non-induced defendants. 
 77 Theoretical justifications for the excusal of criminal liability (and non-punishment) of 
entrapped defendants are therefore related and may overlap, but are not identical. 
 78 In other words, one could equate culpability with legal guilt of the criminal offense. See 
Husak, supra note 12, at 459 (defining a narrow view of culpability as the required mental state 
in the offense as defined by the penal code). 
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squares with the general theory of retribution.79 Although some 
retributivists argue that the harm caused by the offense should be a 
factor in determining a just punishment80 (which technically would 
include offense conduct induced by the police), this consideration is 
arguably less relevant in undercover policing cases in which there is 
typically no actual victim or harm caused.81 Moreover, sentencing 
offense conduct induced by the police runs counter to retribution 
theory’s consideration of individual autonomy as a component of a just 
punishment.82 That a defendant may have been motivated by police 
inducements and, due to those inducements, did not make a truly 
independent and volitional choice, contributes to an understanding of 
what a “deserved” punishment should be.83 Thus, a sentence based on 
an evaluation of a defendant’s culpability for particular offense conduct, 
which includes a consideration of police inducements, serves the general 
retributive goal of proportional and fair punishment. 
A reduction of sentence based on induced offense conduct is also 
compatible with the consequentialist aims of incapacitation and 
deterrence. To achieve the goal of effective incapacitation of offenders, 
 79 See MICHAEL S. MOORE, PLACING BLAME 88 (1997) (stating that retributivists “are 
committed to the principle that punishment should be graded in proportion to desert”); 
Andrew von Hirsch, Proportionate Sentences: A Desert Perspective, in PRINCIPLED SENTENCING 
115, 118 (Andrew von Hirsch et al. eds., 3d ed. 2009) (stating that modern desert theory centers 
on notions of proportionality); see also Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2028 (2010) (stating 
that at “[t]he heart of the retribution rationale is that a criminal sentence must be directly 
related to the personal culpability of the criminal offender” (alteration in original) (quoting 
Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 80 See MOORE, supra note 79, at 194–96 (describing two views of retributivism, one that 
considers the harm of the offense as part of desert and one that does not). 
 81 That is to say, since no actual harm is caused by police-induced conduct, harm cannot be 
an independent justification for punishment of police-induced conduct. See Jonathan C. 
Carlson, The Act Requirement and the Foundations of the Entrapment Defense, 73 VA. L. REV. 
1011, 1061–62 (1987) (stating that an encouraged act by the government is not a basis for 
punishment under retributive theory in part because there is no harm to societal or legal 
interests); cf. Jacqueline E. Ross, Valuing Inside Knowledge: Police Infiltration as a Problem for 
the Law of Evidence, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1111, 1118 (2004) (discussing German sentencing 
law which links punishment to “harms and risk of harms” and treats crimes involving 
undercover officers as “reducing the risk of harm”). 
 82 See H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 181 (2d ed. 2008) (discussing the 
need to reconsider notions of responsibility and the voluntary nature of a criminal act); NICOLA 
LACEY, STATE PUNISHMENT: POLITICAL PRINCIPLES AND COMMUNITY VALUES 154 (1988) 
(explaining that retributive justice is grounded in liberal notions of autonomy and free, 
informed choice); Michael S. Moore, Prima Facie Moral Culpability, 76 B.U. L. REV. 319, 320 
(1996) (“[O]ne is culpable if he chooses to do wrong in circumstances when that choice is freely 
made.”). 
 83 See Carlson, supra note 81, at 1084 (stating that the use of encouragement to detect and 
punish suspects conflicts with requirements of personal autonomy); Gerald Dworkin, The 
Serpent Beguiled Me and I Did Eat: Entrapment and the Creation of Crime, 4 LAW & PHIL. 17, 
26 (1985) (stating that the use of temptations by police raises issues of “the overcoming of the 
will” and responsibility). 
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one must predict a defendant’s likelihood of reoffending.84 Similarly, 
specific deterrence—deterrence of the individual defendant—also 
incorporates a determination of the likelihood that the defendant will 
commit the crime again.85 The critical inquiry is therefore the likelihood 
that the defendant will re-commit the crime for which he is currently 
being punished (and for which we are justifying punishment). In the 
case of sentencing induced conduct, the predictive question becomes: 
will the defendant commit the induced conduct again? To answer this, 
one must first ask, will the same criminal opportunity present itself 
again to the defendant? For crimes involving more excessive 
inducements and unrealistic temptations, the answer is likely to be no.86 
Because it is less likely that the defendant will recommit this conduct in 
the same way under the same circumstances, an incapacitation or 
specific deterrence rationale provides less justification for the 
punishment of induced conduct.87 
There may be a general deterrence argument in favor of punishing 
induced conduct. Sentencing based on the objective of general 
deterrence is aimed at influencing the behavior of other potential 
offenders.88 There may be some general deterrent benefit to punish all 
criminal conduct no matter the cause or circumstances of that 
conduct.89 Questions remain, however, regarding the extent of this 
benefit and at what cost it is achieved, both in terms of the resources 
 84 See Andrew von Hirsch, Introduction to Chapter Three: Incapacitation, in PRINCIPLED 
SENTENCING, supra note 79, at 75, 75. 
 85 See Julian V. Roberts & Andrew Ashworth, Introduction to Chapter 2: Deterrence, in 
PRINCIPLED SENTENCING, supra note 79, at 39, 40. 
 86 As Professor Seidman stated: 
If the inducement is unlikely to be replicated, then a defendant responding to it poses 
little danger, and the enforcement costs are largely wasted. If the inducement is 
unusually attractive, then the possibility of deterring those tempted to succumb is 
small, and the effort to deter them may again produce a less than optimal allocation 
of resources. 
Louis Michael Seidman, The Supreme Court, Entrapment, and Our Criminal Justice Dilemma, 
1981 SUP. CT. REV. 111, 142–43; see also Allen et al., supra note 25, at 415–16 (arguing that the 
fact that a suspect responded to below-market rate inducements renders an incapacitation 
justification meaningless); Hay, supra note 24, at 425 (suggesting that deterrence benefits 
require the police to offer realistic inducements); McAdams, supra note 34, at 163 (agreeing 
that, to a certain extent, no deterrence or incapacitation benefits are derived from punishing 
offenders who would not commit this offense again except in an undercover operation). 
 87 In addition, studies of the effects of prison sentences suggest that more severe 
punishment does not result in lower rates of criminality for the individual being punished. Tom 
R. Tyler & Jonathan Jackson, Future Challenges in the Study of Legitimacy and Criminal Justice 
2 (Yale Law Sch. Pub. Law Working Paper No. 264, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com.
abstract=2141322. 
 88 See Roberts & Ashworth, supra note 85, at 40. 
 89 See Carlson, supra note 81, at 1068–69 (detailing deterrence-focused arguments in favor 
of punishing government-encouraged crimes such as increasing the perception of the 
prosecution of victimless crimes). 
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used in carrying out the punishment and the diversion of resources 
from the punishment of other crimes.90 In addition, in the context of 
justifying the sentencing of induced conduct, the efficacy of lengthening 
sentences as a mechanism for the deterrence of others, as well as the 
general deterrent effect of undercover operations that use unrealistic 
inducements, raises questions regarding the extent of any benefit 
gained.91 
The premise that induced defendants should be sentenced less 
severely than non-induced defendants is also directly supported by the 
systemic goal of identifying less blameworthy defendants and mitigating 
their sentences accordingly. It is a long-standing principle of criminal 
sentencing that an offender’s blameworthiness dictates, at least to some 
extent, the severity of the punishment.92 Through its focus on a 
defendant’s culpability, the sentencing manipulation doctrine 
recognizes that there are gradations of blameworthiness that can, and 
should, be accounted for in sentencing.93 
The theories considered here—retribution, deterrence, and 
incapacitation94—as well as the systemic interest in identifying those 
who are deemed less blameworthy, are reflected in Congress’s 
instructions to judges on what to take into account in sentencing.95 As 
 90 See McAdams, supra note 34, at 158 (discussing how there is “far less deterrence or 
incapacitation” in punishing probabilistic offenders); Tracey L. Meares et al., Updating the 
Study of Punishment, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1171, 1173 (2004) (discussing failures of deterrent theory 
studies to consider other effects of criminal laws including substitution of other crimes and 
other normative reasons why a person may be deterred from breaking the law); Gideon Yaffe, 
“The Government Beguiled Me”: The Entrapment Defense and the Problem of Private 
Entrapment, 1 J. ETHICS & SOC. PHIL. 2, 10 (2005) (“Deterrent pressures are a societal cost; they 
should be exerted only if by doing so crime rates can be substantially reduced.”). 
 91 See Steven N. Durlauf & Daniel S. Nagin, Imprisonment and Crime: Can Both Be 
Reduced?, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 13, 14 (2011) (discussing empirical finding of a 
marginal deterrence impact, at most, of increasing already lengthy prison sentences); Gary T. 
Marx, Police Undercover Work: Ethical Deception or Deceptive Ethics?, in POLICE ETHICS: HARD 
CHOICES IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 83, 84 (William C. Heffernan & Timothy Stroup eds., 1985) 
[hereinafter Marx, Police Undercover Work] (describing research on effectiveness of undercover 
tactics as limited but not suggesting a deterrent effect). 
 92 See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 156 (1987) (“Deeply ingrained in our legal tradition is 
the idea that the more purposeful is the criminal conduct . . . the more severely it ought to be 
punished.”). 
 93 Cf. Jack B. Weinstein & Fred A. Bernstein, The Denigration of Mens Rea in Drug 
Sentencing, 7 FED. SENT’G REP. 121, 122 (1994) (“Culpability doctrines do more than separate 
the innocent from the guilty. They mediate between the individual and society, ensuring that a 
complex web of legal commands and protections operates effectively and in a properly nuanced 
fashion.”). 
 94 Rehabilitation is a fourth theoretical justification for punishment. See Andrew Ashworth, 
Introduction to Chapter One: Rehabilitation, in PRINCIPLED SENTENCING, supra note 79, at 1. It 
is difficult to suggest a rehabilitative goal that would be served by increasing a sentence based 
on conduct a defendant only committed due to excessive inducements by the police. 
 95 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) (outlining sentencing considerations, including “to 
provide just punishment for the offense,” “to afford adequate deterrence,” and “to protect the 
public from further crimes of the defendant”). 
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the Ninth Circuit recognized, a defendant who committed certain 
aspects of the crime due to excessive inducements by the police is “both 
less morally blameworthy than an enthusiastic [defendant] and less 
likely to commit other crimes if not incarcerated.”96 These factors—
“protection of the public” and “characteristics particular to the 
defendant’s culpability”—are of central concern in the sentencing 
calculus.97 
The second foundational premise of the sentencing manipulation 
doctrine is the idea that police inducements are of specific concern to 
the criminal justice system and its jurisprudence. Our unease could be 
based solely on the use of inducements and their impact on a 
defendant’s culpability, and therefore one could argue that a doctrine 
(whether at trial or sentencing) should apply to inducements used by 
private individuals as well as the police.98 But inducements used by the 
police or their agents raise unique concerns germane to the interests of 
the criminal justice system. Undercover operations that induce 
particular offense conduct raise the specter that the government is in 
effect “creating” crime. Would the crime have occurred if the police had 
not encouraged it? There is also the risk of “crime amplification”—the 
occurrence of unintended subsequent crimes as a result of the initial 
government-aided opportunity.99 The potential for undercover 
operations to possibly increase crime provokes an important 
conversation regarding the use of limited law enforcement resources.100  
The use of extensive police inducements also has potential negative 
implications for the social legitimacy of law enforcement. If the police 
 96 United States v. McClelland, 72 F.3d 717, 726 (9th Cir. 1995) (alteration in original) 
(quoting United States v. Garza-Juarez, 992 F.2d 896, 913 n.1 (1993)). 
 97 Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). These factors are also included in state sentencing 
schemes. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 35-38-1-7.1 (2012); People v. Farrar, 419 N.E.2d 864, 865 (N.Y. 
1981) (“The determination of an appropriate sentence requires . . . due consideration given 
to . . . the particular circumstances of the individual before the court and the purpose of a penal 
sanction, i.e., societal protection, rehabilitation and deterrence.”). 
 98 See Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses: A Systematic Analysis, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 
199, 237 (1982) (noting that if the focus of the entrapment defense was solely on inducements 
that render a defendant blameless then it should apply to private actor inducers as well). One 
possible response is that a criminal law doctrine is more effective in shaping the strategic 
decision-making of the system’s own actors (i.e., the police) as opposed to affecting third party 
behavior. In addition, inducements by private actors are punished—and therefore to some 
extent deterred—through other substantive criminal laws (e.g., accomplice and conspiracy 
liability and solicitation offenses). See McAdams, supra note 34, at 166. Furthermore, the 
argument that the sentencing manipulation doctrine should be limited to police inducements 
does not prohibit the broader argument that all inducements should be taken into account in 
determining a defendant’s culpability and sentence. 
 99 For example, one unintended consequence would be the continued support of black 
markets that produce more crime. See GARY T. MARX, UNDERCOVER: POLICE SURVEILLANCE IN 
AMERICA 126–27 (1988); Joh, supra note 1, at 165. 
 100 See Marx, Who Really Gets Stung, supra note 1, at 172 (stating that the use of 
“temptation” in undercover operations raises concerns of “the questionable fairness of such a 
technique, and whether scarce resources ought to be used to pose temptation”). 
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are—to state colloquially—“going out of their way” to induce a crime or 
particular criminal conduct, such action may well injure the public’s 
perception of the police as moral and fair actors.101 The governmental 
creation of crime in order to punish that crime has the potential to butt 
up against our collective notions of fairness as well as raise ethical 
questions regarding the role of undercover police officers.102 This in 
turn may impact the public’s confidence in the police and their level of 
cooperation with the police, particularly in communities with 
historically troubled relationships between citizens and law 
enforcement.103 These potential consequences of the use of inducements 
by the police should be of concern to the criminal justice system, a 
system that relies heavily on public participation, assistance, and trust.104 
In sum, a sentencing manipulation doctrine focused on police 
inducements and their impact on a defendant’s culpability is justified by 
both sentencing considerations for the individual defendant and 
systemic interests in promoting the legitimacy of law enforcement. A 
sentencing mitigation theory such as this one enables a nuanced 
evaluation of moral blameworthiness and simultaneously serves as a 
disincentive for police conduct that potentially results in a loss of public 
support. 
 101 See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 74 (2006) (summarizing studies as 
showing that “citizens evaluate the actions of legal and political authorities based on how fair 
the outcomes are for themselves and others”); Tom R. Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and 
Cooperation: Why Do People Help the Police Fight Crime in Their Communities?, 6 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 231, 263–64 (2008) (presenting study findings showing that people are more willing to 
cooperate with the police if they view the police as legitimate, and that legitimacy stems in part 
from people’s judgments about “the fairness by which the police exercise their authority”). 
 102 See Marx, Police Undercover Work, supra note 91, at 107 (“In general terms, an 
undercover operation may offer an ethical approach, while particular aspects of it may be 
unethical.”); cf. Robinson, supra note 98, at 237 (noting that the entrapment defense is based in 
part on “an estoppel notion that it is unfair to permit the entity that has entrapped to also 
prosecute and punish”). For example, is it “fair” for the police to deliberately place undercover 
operations in a school zone, a locale in which Congress and state legislatures have—through 
sentencing enhancement statutes—purposefully tried to prevent and discourage crimes from 
occurring, and then request those same sentencing enhancements at a defendant’s sentencing? 
See infra Part III.B.3.d (discussing school zone cases). 
 103 See JOHN KLEINIG, THE ETHICS OF POLICING 137 (1996) (discussing social costs of police 
deception such as loss of trust in government officials); Leo & Skolnick, supra note 2, at 9 
(arguing that police deception undermines public confidence, cooperation, and belief in law 
enforcement’s veracity, “especially in the second America”); Tom R. Tyler, Enhancing Police 
Legitimacy, 593 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 84, 95–96 (2004) (stating that people’s 
beliefs regarding the legitimacy of law enforcement impact their cooperation with the police 
and citing studies that document distrust of the police and racial differences within those levels 
of distrust). 
 104 See Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 911, 916–17 (2006) (describing need for public participation in criminal justice system); 
Tyler & Fagan, supra note 101, at 233 (stating that police rely on public cooperation, both in 
obeying the law and working with the police to combat crime). Concerns regarding the 
legitimacy of police inducements also speak to the larger debate over the use of deception 
generally by law enforcement. 
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B.     Sentencing Manipulation Critiqued 
This Section evaluates the sentencing manipulation doctrine as 
currently defined and applied. This critique is now grounded in 
theoretical justifications for a sentencing manipulation doctrine and in 
the understanding that the use of inducements may influence an 
assessment of a defendant’s culpability at sentencing. An examination in 
this light illuminates the problematic aspects of the three doctrinal 
components previously highlighted: the focus on a particular amount of 
police misconduct, the requirement of an improper government motive, 
and the consideration of the defendant’s predisposition.105 
1.     The Requisite Police Conduct 
As noted earlier, there is no clear understanding of “how much” 
police misconduct is required to prevail on a sentencing manipulation 
claim. While there is certainly a doctrinal role for the consideration of 
the nature of the police conduct, the “level” of misconduct required is 
frequently an undefined and, in effect, impossibly high standard to 
meet.106 In some jurisdictions, it is the exact same standard as required 
to bar prosecution under an “outrageous government conduct” trial 
phase claim.107 This high prerequisite of governmental malfeasance 
helps explain why many courts have never ruled in favor of a defendant 
in a sentencing manipulation claim or even taken the opportunity to 
decide whether or not they recognize the doctrine in theory.108 
As a preliminary matter, using the exact same standard as a due 
process-based trial phase claim makes no analytical sense. The same 
“amount” of police misconduct that bars prosecution under the due 
process clause should not be the same as required for a claim that 
merely asks for a reduction of sentence.109 Clearly, if that standard of 
 105 For the sake of clarity—and mindful of the goal of a uniform, reformulated doctrine—the 
remainder of the Article will refer to the claim of “sentencing manipulation” as encompassing 
all of the cited variations and as the normative label of a reformed doctrine. 
 106 See supra text accompanying notes 30–67. 
 107 See supra note 64. 
 108 See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 18 F.3d 1145, 1153–54 (4th Cir. 1994) (stating that 
sentencing manipulation requires “outrageous government conduct” and that the court has not 
yet accepted the legal viability of the claim because it has never found the requisite facts); see 
also supra note 75. 
 109 See Jones, 18 F.3d at 1154 (noting the court’s “skepticism as to whether the government 
could ever engage in conduct not outrageous enough so as to violate due process to an extent 
warranting dismissal of the government’s prosecution, yet outrageous enough to offend due 
process to an extent warranting a downward departure with respect to a defendant’s 
sentencing”); State v. Steadman, 827 So. 2d 1022, 1025 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (stating that to 
require a showing of “outrageous conduct” essentially rejects the principle of sentencing 
manipulation entirely because such a showing would amount to a complete defense). 
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police conduct was met, the defendant would prefer a dismissal of the 
charges against him. Similarly, the “amount” of police misconduct 
needed to prevail on the trial phase defense of entrapment—sufficient to 
induce an innocent person to commit the crime—is more than what 
should be required to justify a decrease in sentence given that the same 
“amount” would also potentially result in an acquittal. 
Sentencing manipulation’s roots in the trial phase doctrines of 
entrapment and outrageous government conduct explain but do not 
justify courts’ insistence on an undefined high level of government 
misconduct. With respect to the trial phase claims, it is understandable 
that an extraordinary level of misconduct would be required in order to 
justify the bright-line and extreme results that these claims permit (i.e. 
dismissal or acquittal). Entrapment and outrageous government 
conduct are each “an all-or-nothing doctrine, allowing no subtlety or 
gradation in the analysis of government behavior or its effect.”110 A 
sentencing doctrine, by contrast, allows a graded assessment of both 
police conduct and its impact on a defendant’s culpability.111 
In addition, the requirement of a specific quantity of police 
misconduct is itself somewhat misleading. The focus of the claim with 
respect to police conduct is police inducements that are used to such an 
extent, or are of such an excessive nature, that they have the effect of 
pressuring and persuading the defendant to commit particular offense 
conduct. As is explored further in Part III, there is no “magic number” 
that would permit a judge to decide that the inducements went so far as 
to affect a determination of the defendant’s relative blameworthiness as 
compared to offenders not subject to such government encouragement. 
An assessment of the inducements and their effect on the suspect’s 
actions requires a more qualitative—rather than quantitative—
evaluation than a standard requiring a particular level of police 
misconduct suggests. 
2.     The Government Motive 
The requirement of an improper motive by the police is a related 
and equally problematic aspect of the current definitions of sentencing 
manipulation.112 In many jurisdictions, a defendant must demonstrate 
 110 MILLER & WRIGHT, supra note 32, at 1395; see also Ross, supra note 81, at 1127, 1144 
(stating that the entrapment defense and outrageous government conduct claim focus “only on 
extreme cases” with “inordinate inducements”). 
 111 See, e.g., United States v. Briggs, 397 F. App’x 329, 332–33 (9th Cir. 2010) (affirming 
denial of defendant’s outrageous government conduct motion but also affirming downward 
departure in sentence based on overstatement of culpability concerns). 
 112 The argument that the subjective police motive should not guide a court’s inquiry 
parallels the Supreme Court’s position that an officer’s motive—even a pretextual one—is 
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that the sole intent of, and justification for, the police tactics was to 
increase the defendant’s sentence.113 
This requirement is hard to square with the realities of law 
enforcement practice. While it is likely that most police officers know 
that offering crack cocaine instead of powder cocaine will increase a 
suspect’s eventual sentence, it is also likely that officers will 
simultaneously have “legitimate” law enforcement reasons for their 
operational decisions.114 Legitimate law enforcement justifications for 
police conduct include: to identify other players or coconspirators in the 
criminal enterprise,115 to seize additional narcotics,116 and to ensure they 
have sufficient evidence to convict a suspect in court.117 Broad 
justifications like “test[ing] the scope of a drug dealer’s criminal 
activities”118 and law enforcement’s “responsibility to enforce the 
criminal laws of this country”119 justify almost all imaginable police 
conduct.120 Moreover, courts are generally very reluctant to intrude on 
law enforcement and their investigatory methods.121 In short, it is a rare 
irrelevant in a search and seizure analysis under the Fourth Amendment. See Ashcroft v. al-
Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2080–81 (2011) (stating that, in general, the subjective motivations of 
government officials are irrelevant, and stating “we have almost uniformly rejected invitations 
to probe subjective intent”); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812–13 (1996) (explaining 
precedent holding that the actual motivations of police officers are not part of the 
reasonableness analysis). 
 113 See supra notes 68–69. 
 114 See, e.g., United States v. Torres, 563 F.3d 731, 735 (8th Cir. 2009) (describing police 
officer’s testimony that they did not arrest the defendant after the first narcotics buy because 
they were “[t]rying to build a bigger case” and because repeat buys were necessary to build the 
defendant’s trust and identify coconspirators).  
  More cynically, it is also possible that police officers will be able to easily state a 
legitimate reason even if the tactic was actually undertaken at the time for the sole purpose of 
exposing the suspect to a higher mandatory sentence. On the Florida Department of Law 
Enforcement’s website, in a post discussing a recent court case in which a judge granted a 
downward departure based on sentencing manipulation, the Regional Legal Advisor wrote: 
“NOTE: If you make the decision not to immediately arrest the defendant and he engages in 
further illegal activity, be prepared to convince the judge that you did so for a reason other than 
simply attempting to increase the sentence.” Steve Brady, 02-14: Police Engaging in Sentence 
Manipulation, FLA. DEP’T OF LAW ENFORCEMENT (Sept. 13, 2002), http://www.fdle.state.fl.us/
Content/getdoc/2839a6fd-d13c-4c47-8178-97f9d7ccfb04/02-14----Police-Engaging-in-
Sentence-Manipulation.aspx. 
 115 United States v. Calva, 979 F.2d 119, 123 (8th Cir. 1992). 
 116 United States v. Flores-Martinez, No. 92-30253, 1993 WL 366586, at *2 (9th Cir. Sept. 20, 
1993). 
 117 United States v. Baker, 63 F.3d 1478, 1500 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 118 United States v. Floyd, 375 F. App’x 88, 90 (2d Cir. 2010); see also United States v. 
Connell, 960 F.2d 191, 196 (1st Cir. 1992) (“[A] well-constructed sting is often sculpted to test 
the limits of the target’s criminal inclinations”). 
 119 United States v. Jones, 18 F.3d 1145, 1155 (4th Cir. 1994). 
 120 Cf. United States v. Glover, 153 F.3d 749, 756 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (opining that the police 
did not appear to have “much motive” to place the narcotics transaction in a school zone in 
order to mandate an increased sentence because the defendant had previously served longer 
prison terms). 
 121 See Harmon, supra note 11, at 776 (stating that courts are deferential to the police in part 
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occasion when a police officer will not be able to state a “proper” police 
motive, thus essentially resulting in a blanket denial of all sentencing 
manipulation claims. 
Like a requisite quantity of police misconduct, the requirement of 
an improper police motive is rooted in the trial phase claims’ focus on 
egregious, outrageous, or excessive police conduct. The notion of police 
impropriety is inherent in a discussion of both entrapment and 
outrageous government conduct. In the context of a sentencing 
manipulation claim, a focus on the motivation behind police conduct is 
similarly understandable—even implied by the very name of the claim 
itself. Moreover, we have an interest in prohibiting, or at least 
disincentivizing, certain types of police conduct. 
But in the context of a sentencing claim, the requirement of an 
improper motive ignores the needed link between the police conduct 
and the justification for a reduction in sentence. Regardless of whether 
police officers are explicitly making strategic choices based on 
sentencing laws (and the desire to increase a suspect’s sentence), the 
motivation for the law enforcement conduct or the inducements used 
may or may not be relevant from the perspective of assessing the 
defendant’s culpability. As will be demonstrated in Part III, not all 
police conduct that affects a defendant’s sentence also impacts an 
evaluation of the defendant’s culpability. There are cases in which the 
police deliberately choose an amount of narcotics or the value of a soon-
to-be-stolen item in order to increase the ultimate sentence (in other 
words, they have an “improper” motive), but such police conduct—due 
to a lack of inducements used—does not impact an evaluation of the 
defendant’s culpability. Evidence of the lack of a legitimate law 
enforcement motive may serve as a red flag that excessive inducements 
were used.122 But the converse may or may not be true—the presence of 
due to recognition of limited institutional competence); Jacqueline E. Ross, The Place of Covert 
Surveillance in Democratic Societies: A Comparative Study of the United States and Germany, 55 
AM. J. COMP. L. 493, 512 (2007) (noting the minor role of the judiciary in regulating policing 
other than the entrapment defense); see also Jones, 18 F.3d at 1155 (declining to impose a rule 
that would “unnecessarily and unfairly restrict the discretion and judgment of investigators and 
prosecutors”); United States v. Calva, 979 F.2d 119, 123 (8th Cir. 1992) (“Police must be given 
sufficient leeway to construct cases built on evidence that proves guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”). 
 122 For example, in United States v. Cannon, the district court found that there was no 
legitimate law enforcement justification for the operational decision to introduce a machine 
gun into the transaction other than to increase the defendant’s sentence by twenty-five years. 
See 886 F. Supp. 705, 708 (D.N.D. 1995), rev’d on other grounds, 88 F.3d 1495 (8th Cir. 1996). 
Similarly, in United States v. Berg, the government provided the defendant with the necessary 
amount of a precursor chemical needed to manufacture methamphetamine in order to ensure 
the maximum possible penalty. 178 F.3d 976 (8th Cir. 1999). The dissenting judge opined that 
there was no legitimate government justification for the provision of this particular amount. Id. 
at 985–86 (Bright, J., dissenting). However, given that these examples come from an overruled 
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a proper motive does not necessarily mean that the defendant should be 
sentenced on the basis of all offense conduct committed. The presence 
of a proper motive, as well as the presence of an improper motive, does 
not on its own dictate the impact of the police conduct on an assessment 
of the defendant’s culpability. The doctrinal requirement of proof of an 
improper motive virtually ensures that a defendant will not prevail on 
his claim and misguides the court’s appropriate focus on the reasons for, 
and the context of, the defendant’s actions. 
3.     The Defendant’s Predisposition 
Clearly rooted in the trial phase entrapment defense, the explicit or 
implicit consideration of a defendant’s predisposition to commit the 
offense conduct is a third problematic aspect of the current application 
of the sentencing manipulation claim. A defendant’s predisposition is 
generally defined in the legal context as his “state of mind and 
inclinations before his initial exposure to government agents.”123 
In the context of the entrapment defense, determining whether a 
defendant was predisposed to commit the crime is notoriously 
difficult.124 Indeed, the notion that a lack of predisposition can be 
demonstrated in a criminal case is perhaps itself nonsensical.125 But, in 
the context of a sentencing claim, the consideration of a defendant’s 
predisposition is even more analytically incongruous. 
The very concept of predisposition differentiates between a guilty 
criminal and an “unwary innocent.”126 While this stark division may be 
opinion and a judge in dissent, in practice, a court may seldom find an illegitimate or improper 
law enforcement motive. 
 123 United States v. Kaminski, 703 F.2d 1004, 1008 (7th Cir. 1983) (emphasis omitted) 
(quoting U.S. v. Janotti, 501 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1191 (E.D. Pa. 1980)) (internal quotations marks 
omitted); see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1297 (9th ed. 2009) (defining predisposition as 
“[a] person’s inclination to engage in a particular activity; esp., an inclination that vitiates a 
criminal defendant’s claim of entrapment”). 
 124 See MARCUS, supra note 30, § 4.05, at 127 (stating that the “predisposition” element of 
the entrapment defense has been the chief source of litigation); Anthony M. Dillof, Unraveling 
Unlawful Entrapment, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 827, 833–34 (2004) (discussing courts’ 
difficulty in applying factors to determine a defendant’s predisposition). 
 125 See Bennett L. Gershman, Abscam, the Judiciary, and the Ethics of Entrapment, 91 YALE 
L.J. 1565, 1581 (1982) (“[T]he defendant is said to be predisposed because he committed the 
act, and then is held responsible for the act because he was predisposed.”); see also Allen et al., 
supra note 25, at 413–14 (arguing that “predisposition” cannot meaningfully distinguish 
between innocent and guilty as every defendant is predisposed to a certain extent to commit the 
crime they are charged with having committed); Carlson, supra note 81, at 1040 
(“Predisposition, on its own, is thus an almost meaningless concept. By their very actions, all 
entrapped defendants show their willingness to engage in crime under certain circumstances.”). 
 126 United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 429 (1973); see also Gershman, supra note 125, at 
1582 (stating that the concept of predisposition divides society into two distinct classes of 
unwary innocents and corrupt criminals, but “[h]uman nature . . . is not so neatly 
categorized”). 
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appropriate for a trial phase claim, in the sentencing context it makes 
little sense. At sentencing, it is inherent that the defendant is 
predisposed to commit some offense—he was, in fact, found guilty or 
admitted his guilt of some crime. Moreover, the question of a 
defendant’s predisposition operates as a complete yes or no question—
was the defendant ready and willing to commit the crime? At 
sentencing, however, the question should be a more nuanced question 
of “how willing was the defendant” or “how willing to do what?” The 
bare dichotomy of guilt versus innocence forced by the consideration of 
predisposition is not appropriate at sentencing, a context that 
necessarily focuses on degrees and gradations of culpability and 
blameworthiness. 
In theory, a sentencing manipulation claim asks the judge to take a 
scaled approach to predisposition. The judge asks not whether a person 
went from an innocent to a criminal, but rather whether a defendant 
transformed from a criminal in one way to a criminal in another way. 
For instance, was the defendant predisposed only to deal in small 
quantities of drugs or only in powder cocaine rather than crack 
cocaine?127 In practice, however, the concept of grades of predisposition 
rarely carries any analytical weight. For example, the Court of Appeals 
for the D.C. Circuit, upon considering a sentencing entrapment claim, 
stated that “[p]ersons ready, willing and able to deal drugs—persons like 
[the defendants]—could hardly be described as innocents.”128 By 
incorporating the same legal term, “predisposition,” into the sentencing 
claim definition, the vestiges of the concept from the trial phase remain 
and judges stay trapped in the guilt-innocence dichotomy.129 
Objections in application aside, the consideration of a defendant’s 
predisposition during sentencing effectively shifts the analytical focus 
away from an examination of police conduct and its impact on a 
defendant’s culpability.130 As Judge Posner points out, determining 
 127 See, e.g., United States v. Shepherd, 102 F.3d 558, 567 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (noting 
defendant’s arguments that he was predisposed to deal in powder cocaine and that government 
agents improperly encouraged him to switch to crack cocaine). 
 128 United States v. Walls, 70 F.3d 1323, 1329 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (stating that the fact that 
defendants were predisposed to dealing in powder cocaine necessarily means they were 
predisposed to dealing in crack cocaine as well). 
 129 See Eric P. Berlin, Reducing Harm as a Determinative Factor: The Hidden Problem with 
Sentencing Entrapment, 7 FED. SENT’G REP. 186, 187 (1995) (noting that courts are reluctant to 
find sentencing entrapment because offenders who make the claim “have admittedly 
demonstrated a predisposition to engage in some crime”); see also, e.g., United States v. Franco, 
826 F. Supp. 1168, 1170–71 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (finding that the fact that defendant only previously 
dealt in small quantities was not evidence of lack of predisposition for large quantity sale but 
rather simply evidence that defendant did not previously have enough money for such a sale). 
 130 This critique also holds true for a critique of predisposition within the entrapment 
doctrine. See Joh, supra note 1, at 172 (discussing how consideration of predisposition in the 
entrapment claim has allowed courts to fail to define what is permissible undercover police 
conduct). 
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whether someone is predisposed to commit the crime is asking whether 
“it is likely that the defendant would have committed the crime anyway” 
even without the participation of government agents.131 Consequently, a 
determination of predisposition relies largely on evidence of a 
defendant’s prior criminal record and past “bad acts” in order to shed 
light on the defendant’s subjective intent and willingness during the 
crime itself.132 This focus on the past conduct of the defendant—and the 
hypothetical of what the defendant might have done absent the police 
participation—renders moot the consideration of police inducements 
used in the actual transaction.133 
For the sake of argument, imagine a suspect who previously dealt 
in crack cocaine. He was caught, prosecuted, and served substantial 
prison time. After his release, he returned to the drug trade but this time 
made the conscious decision to buy and sell only small amounts of 
powder cocaine, knowing he would face less serious penalties if caught 
again. One day, the suspect is approached by an undercover officer, who 
first offers to sell him an amount of crack cocaine at half the market 
rate. The suspect declines, but after much encouragement and even 
some veiled threats to complete the sale, eventually agrees. In this 
scenario, a consideration of predisposition would clearly result in a 
finding that the suspect was predisposed to buy crack cocaine. By 
focusing on whether the defendant would have done the crime, even 
without the police involvement, the police inducements that were 
actually used are rendered irrelevant.134 This irrelevance runs counter to 
the focus of a normative sentencing manipulation doctrine—a focus on 
police inducements, and the defendant’s responses to those 
inducements, during the offense transaction itself. 
It is important to recognize that a suspect’s disposition will clearly 
influence his own conduct during a criminal offense, including his 
 131 United States v. Kaminski, 703 F.2d 1004, 1010 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J., concurring). 
 132 See Bennett, supra note 30, at 844–45 (describing factors to determine whether a 
defendant was predisposed). 
 133 See Carlson, supra note 81, at 1039 (discussing how the predisposition test permits the 
government to use even extreme inducements against suspects generally considered to be 
criminal); McAdams, supra note 34, at 118 (noting that predisposed suspects do not merit the 
entrapment defense “regardless of the strength of the government inducement”); see also, e.g., 
United States v. Fontes, 415 F.3d 174, 179–81 (1st Cir. 2005) (finding no sentencing 
manipulation because defendant was predisposed to dealing in crack cocaine even though the 
government agent admitted during evidentiary hearing that he switched to crack cocaine in 
part to get a higher sentence); United States v. Glover, 153 F.3d 749, 756 (D.C. Cir. 1998) 
(stating that even if the government had purposefully chosen to do the drug transaction in a 
school zone just to increase defendant’s sentence, defendant would still need to show he was 
not predisposed). 
 134 In this hypothetical, the consideration of the defendant’s predisposition effectively 
overrides an inducement the United States Sentencing Commission itself has found 
problematic. See infra text accompanying note 146 (describing an acceptable reduction in 
sentence if the Government uses a below-market rate purchase price). 
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reactions to any police inducements.135 In this way, the consequences of 
a suspect’s predisposition—that is, the current effects of a defendant’s 
past conduct as observed in the current transaction—will be part of the 
evaluation of a sentencing manipulation claim. But as illustrated by the 
hypothetical, the inclusion of “predisposition” as a doctrinal component 
prohibits a graded assessment of a defendant’s culpability for the offense 
conduct committed with the participation of the undercover officer. The 
normative sentencing manipulation doctrine includes “precisely those 
who are predisposed but who are then pressured unduly by the 
government to go forward with the offense.”136 The focus should 
therefore remain strictly on the relationship between the police 
inducements and a defendant’s blameworthiness for the offense conduct 
at issue at sentencing. The consideration of the defendant’s 
predisposition impedes such a focus, both practically and analytically. 
* * * 
The disorder of the sentencing manipulation doctrine ranges from 
the labels used to the definitions given and elements applied. A lack of 
understanding of the theoretical justifications for the doctrine itself and 
of the specific context of a claim made at sentencing enables remnants 
of the entrapment defense and the claim of outrageous government 
conduct to remain entangled in the sentencing manipulation doctrine. 
These aspects of the trial phase claims are analytically inapposite for a 
claim raised at the time of sentencing. Moreover, they prohibit a 
meaningful analysis of undercover police conduct and the impact such 
conduct has on an assessment of a defendant’s culpability. 
III.     A REFORMULATED SENTENCING MANIPULATION DOCTRINE 
The range of undercover police conduct is vast and diverse. From 
multi-year operations to a single drug sale, undercover police officers 
and their agents undertake a wide variety of actions in the name of 
catching criminals. Within each police tactic, be it setting up a crime 
with a single question or the development of a relationship with a 
 135 As part of assessing the degree of culpability for current offense conduct, a defendant’s 
past criminal history is largely irrelevant. Certainly a defendant’s criminal history plays a part 
in sentencing. But the consideration of criminal history is a separate and independent 
sentencing factor rather than a component of assessing culpability for the committed offense 
conduct. 
 136 United States v. McClelland, 72 F.3d 717, 725 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that a defendant is 
eligible for a downward departure based on “imperfect entrapment” even if jury rejected trial 
phase entrapment defense). 
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suspect over time, undercover officers make myriad decisions that 
ultimately affect a defendant’s sentence. An undercover officer insisting 
on buying pure methamphetamine rather than a mixture; an informant 
convincing a suspect to take two stolen televisions instead of one; a 
police department ensuring a bicycle left by the side of the road for 
someone to steal has a particular monetary value—all of these decisions 
will impact the sentence of the defendant.137 
The doctrine of “sentencing manipulation” could be seen as 
broadly encompassing all of the police conduct described above—that 
is, any police conduct that “manipulates” or affects a defendant’s 
sentence. One difficultly with such a definition, however, is that, as 
exemplified above, almost every tactical decision made by undercover 
police officers will impact the defendant’s eventual sentence. More 
significantly, such an expansive definition is missing an analytical link 
between the police conduct at issue and the purpose of the sentencing 
manipulation claim—to ask for (and to merit) a shorter sentence. Stated 
differently, a definition that includes all police conduct that ultimately 
impacts a defendant’s sentence contains no underlying justification as to 
why that particular police conduct justifies a reduction in a defendant’s 
sentence. 
In this Part, I first propose a reformulated sentencing manipulation 
doctrine focused on the use of police inducements and their potential 
impact on an assessment of a defendant’s culpability. I then evaluate the 
undercover police conduct at issue in these claims, including the 
inducements used, and suggest guidelines for the application of my 
proposed doctrinal inquiry. 
A.     Sentencing Manipulation Reformulated 
As evidenced by the current state of the doctrine, it is no easy task 
to define “sentencing manipulation” or prescribe its application. It is 
perhaps simpler to start with what should not be retained from current 
doctrine. The term “sentencing entrapment” must be abandoned, along 
with other vestiges of the related trial phase doctrines, including the 
requirement of a high standard of police impropriety or illegitimate 
 137 In the first hypothetical, a defendant will face a higher mandatory minimum sentence for 
a transaction involving pure methamphetamine. See USSG § 2D1.1(c)(4). In the second 
hypothetical, the defendant could be charged with a misdemeanor for taking one television but 
might be charged with a felony for taking two. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-108.01(A) 
(2012) (stating theft of property with a value of $200 or more with the intent to sell such 
property is a felony and “the larceny of more than one item of the same product is prima facie 
evidence of intent to sell”). Similarly, the suspect in the third example may face a felony theft 
charge if the value of the bicycle is over a certain monetary amount. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-
8-4 to -5 (2012) (establishing a misdemeanor for theft of property valuing less than $500 and a 
felony for property over $500). 
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motive and the consideration of a defendant’s predisposition.138 For the 
sake of simplicity, the label of “sentencing manipulation” should 
encompass all claims that assert that a defendant merits a reduction in 
sentence due to police inducements. The sentencing manipulation 
doctrine should remain firmly rooted in the goals of accurate sentencing 
and a nuanced view of offender blameworthiness. As such, it must be 
grounded at the intersection of police inducements and defendant 
culpability. 
My proposed definition of sentencing manipulation is as follows: 
sentencing manipulation occurs when the inducements used by the 
police or their agents result in the overstatement of a defendant’s 
culpability and, consequently, an excessive and unjustified prison 
sentence. Accepting this recommended definition for the sake of 
argument, the question then becomes how should courts evaluate 
allegations of police inducements of this sort—in other words, how 
should courts determine when a defendant’s culpability is in fact 
“overstated.” 
1.     A Bright-Line Rule 
One possible solution is to create a bright-line rule regarding the 
type of undercover tactic itself, rather than an inquiry into the nature of 
the inducements used within that tactic.139 Such a proposal could look at 
the tactics most likely to contain excessive police inducements and 
prohibit those tactics generally.140 Although a tactic-focused rule would 
clearly be over inclusive (as the use of a particular tactic does not always 
involve the use of problematic inducements), the cost is potentially 
balanced by the clarity of a bright-line rule and the avoidance of a more 
fact-intensive and case-by-case judicial analysis of the inducements 
used. 
Courts, however, are typically reluctant to dictate the exact 
boundaries of law enforcement practices.141 Furthermore, given the 
 138 Because the claim of “sentencing entrapment” typically includes a requirement that the 
defendant demonstrate a lack of predisposition—a doctrinal component I disagree with, see 
supra Part II.B.3—I therefore reject the label and underlying definition and suggest keeping 
“sentencing manipulation” as the name of the reformulated claim. 
 139 I use the term “tactic” to refer to the general type of police operation (e.g., reverse sting 
or “buy and bust”) whereas “inducements” are transactional terms, incentives, statements, or 
temptations that are components of all types of police operations. 
 140 For example, a rule could prohibit the reverse sting tactic. See infra Part III.B.3 (detailing 
reverse sting operations and other tactics likely to contain excessive inducements). 
 141 See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 435 (1973) (refuting the notion that the judicial 
branch has authority to dismiss law enforcement practices of which it does not approve); see 
also sources cited supra note 121. It is interesting to note that this reluctance is a particularly 
American way of viewing policing. Western Europe generally has a much narrower view of 
permissible undercover policing tactics. For instance, the reverse sting tactic is not permitted by 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2016362
TINTO.34.4 (Do Not Delete) 4/19/2013 12:05 PM
2013] U N D E R CO V E R  PO L I C I N G 1433
possible lack of connection between the police tactic and an assessment 
of the defendant’s culpability, it is arguably not appropriate to broadly 
prohibit specific police practices within the context of a sentencing 
mitigation claim.142  
2.     A Guided Inquiry 
Another approach to the sentencing manipulation doctrine is to 
view the claim as a guided inquiry into the use of inducements by the 
police or their agents and the defendant’s responses to those 
inducements. An inducement-focused approach is one that states that a 
reduction in sentence may be warranted when police inducements are 
used to such an extent that the offense conduct committed due to those 
inducements results in a sentence that does not accurately reflect the 
relative culpability of the defendant.143 An evaluation of the 
inducements used is necessarily fact based and case specific, and 
involves an examination of the interaction between the undercover 
officer and the defendant, the individual characteristics of the 
most European police agencies. See Ethan A. Nadelmann, The DEA in Europe, in 
UNDERCOVER: POLICE SURVEILLANCE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 269, 283 (Cyrille Fijnaut 
& Gary T. Marx eds., 1995). 
 142 A rule prohibiting particular police tactics would function akin to the exclusionary rule 
of the Fourth Amendment—a rule designed to deter police misconduct without a link to the 
culpability of the defendant who benefits from the application of that rule. 
 143 If the claim is granted, depending on the applicable sentencing laws, a court could 
downward depart, grant a variance in sentence, refuse to apply the sentencing enhancement, 
avoid a mandatory minimum, or sentence solely on the basis of non-induced offense conduct. 
See Shein, supra note 46, at 28–29; see also, e.g., United States v. Huang, 687 F.3d 1197, 1203 
(9th Cir. 2012) (stating that when a mandatory minimum applies, proper procedure is to not 
apply the penalty provision for the induced conduct and only sentence based on lesser 
conduct); United States v. Beltran, 571 F.3d 1013, 1019 (10th Cir. 2009) (stating that post-
Booker, courts could grant a downward departure or a variance under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) based 
on sentencing manipulation); United States v. Ciszkowski, 492 F.3d 1264, 1270 (11th Cir. 2007) 
(suggesting that a court can remove manipulated conduct from sentencing calculus and thereby 
avoid mandatory minimum); United States v. Fontes, 415 F.3d 174, 180 (1st Cir. 2005) 
(recognizing a court’s ability to impose a sentence below the statutory mandatory minimum as 
an equitable remedy); United States v. Riewe, 165 F.3d 727, 729 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating that 
district court could apply the mandatory minimum for a lesser offense as remedy for 
sentencing manipulation); United States v. Connell, 960 F.2d 191, 196 (1st Cir. 1992) (noting 
that court could downward depart or exclude the “tainted transaction” from Guidelines 
calculation); United States v. Carreiro, 14 F. Supp. 2d 196, 201 (D.R.I. 1998) (stating that the 
only remedy for sentence manipulation in this case was to acquit defendant of the charge). But 
see United States v. Winebarger, 664 F.3d 388, 389 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that a court may 
only impose a sentence below a statutory mandatory minimum under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) based 
on substantial assistance to the government); United States v. Cromitie, No. 09 Cr. 558 (CM), 
2011 WL 2693297, at *4–5 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 2011) (stating that even if the court found 
sentencing manipulation, it had no authority to avoid the mandatory minimum). 
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defendant, the inducements used, and the defendant’s response to those 
inducements.144 
A guided approach to the evaluation of police inducements is 
similar to, though admittedly broader than, the approach the United 
States Sentencing Commission (Sentencing Commission) currently 
takes regarding below-market rate inducements used within the 
undercover policing tactic of a narcotics reverse sting.145 In this context, 
the Sentencing Commission explicitly recognizes that a downward 
departure in sentence may be warranted if the government offers a price 
“substantially below the market value of the controlled substance” 
which thereby induces the defendant to purchase more drugs than he 
would normally be able to buy.146 In this narrow instance, the 
Sentencing Commission flags the potential for overstated culpability 
and affirmatively provides for the possibility of a reduction in sentence. 
As the Ninth Circuit stated in United States v. Staufer: 
The significance of [Application Note 14] is that it shows that the 
Sentencing Commission is aware of the unfairness and arbitrariness 
of allowing [law enforcement] agents to put unwarranted pressure on 
a defendant in order to increase his or her sentence without regard 
for . . . the extent of his culpability.147  
Following my proposal, the Sentencing Commission or the courts could 
raise awareness of the general use of inducements, which similarly 
deserve increased attention when sentencing. 
In contrast to a bright-line rule, an approach that focuses on the 
use of police inducements with an eye towards a reduction in sentence 
appropriately acknowledges the need for police discretion while still 
providing some necessary limits on how that discretion is utilized. 
While it is important for sentencing reforms to allow for some 
discretion in undercover policing, “leaving matters to police discretion 
is not the same as leaving those matters to their arbitrary judgment.”148 
The doctrine of sentencing manipulation as proposed here alerts law 
enforcement to the potential risks and consequences of aggressive 
 144 For instance, courts could ask such questions as: Did the undercover officer or the 
defendant initially suggest a change in transaction type? Did the defendant respond to an 
opportunity similar to a real-life criminal situation? Did the defendant appear reluctant to agree 
to the offense conduct suggested?  
It is important to remember, however, that these questions should not serve as a sort of 
“checklist” of required factors. Rather, these are suggested ways in which a court may examine 
the impact of police inducements. 
 145 See infra text accompanying note 181 (defining reverse sting tactic). 
 146 USSG § 2D1.1 cmt. n.26. In addition, if the defendant is able to establish that he did not 
intend to purchase, or was not “reasonably capable” of purchasing, the ultimate amount of 
narcotics received, that additional amount of narcotics may be excluded from the sentencing 
calculus. id. § 2D1.1, cmt. n.5. 
 147 38 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 1994) (referring to USSG § 2D1.1 cmt. n.14). 
 148 KLEINIG, supra note 103, at 93. 
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inducements. The possibility of a reduction in the suspect’s sentence 
may serve as a disincentive to use questionable inducements in the first 
place.149 Moreover, an inducement-focused sentencing manipulation 
doctrine may also impact the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. The 
knowledge that a court may reduce a sentence based on police 
inducements could result in prosecutors making different charging 
decisions as well as influence those prosecutors who supervise and 
structure undercover operations.150 
B.     Sentencing Manipulation Applied 
Having reconceived and justified the doctrine of sentencing 
manipulation as focused on the role of police inducements and their 
effect on a defendant’s culpability, the question now becomes how to 
conduct this inquiry when faced with the underlying police conduct at 
issue in these claims. Although there are many ways to categorize 
undercover police tactics,151 for my purposes here, I am suggesting a 
way to view police actions that sheds light on when police conduct may 
affect an assessment of the defendant’s culpability at sentencing. My 




 149 See James F. Doyle, Police Discretion, Legality, and Morality, in POLICE ETHICS, supra 
note 91, at 47, 65 (“[D]iscretionary decisions about goals should not commit police to the use of 
means that would call into question the worthiness of the goals pursued.”). 
 150 See MARX, supra note 99, at 190–91 (stating that in many jurisdictions, prosecutors play 
an important role in supervising undercover operations and setting law enforcement priorities 
and targets); Samuel W. Buell, The Upside of Overbreadth, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1491, 1562 (2008) 
(suggesting that judicial reduction of sentences for less serious offenders may encourage 
prosecutors to shift away from charging such cases). 
 151 See, e.g., MARX, supra note 99, at 60 (discussing three categories of undercover operations 
by focusing on operational goals: intelligence, prevention, and facilitation); Christopher 
Slobogin, Deceit, Pretext, and Trickery: Investigative Lies by the Police, 76 OR. L. REV. 775, 805–
06 (1997) (dividing undercover tactics into active and passive categories); Wachtel, supra note 
1, at 152 (suggesting a classification of undercover work based on the targeting mechanism and 
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“Observed culpability” signifies the mere observing of crime by 
undercover officers. At the opposite end of the spectrum, “entrapped 
culpability” encompasses undercover police conduct that would enable 
the defendant to prevail on an entrapment defense or outrageous 
government conduct claim at trial. 
My proposed doctrine of sentencing manipulation is primarily 
concerned with undercover police conduct between these two points. 
This span of undercover police conduct, in which the police participate 
in some way in the criminal transaction, ranges from “facilitated 
culpability” conduct—undercover actions that do not affect an 
assessment of a defendant’s culpability—to police conduct that results in 
“overstated culpability”—a category of police actions I argue does in fact 
impact a culpability assessment. As described in detail below, the nature 
and degree of various inducements used by the police to encourage 
particular criminal conduct causes the police conduct to move along the 
continuum. Viewing police conduct along this line aids the application 
of my proposed doctrine. More completely, this continuum is set up in a 
way so as to suggest that police conduct at the “facilitated culpability” 
end of the spectrum will not merit a reduction in sentence. While police 
conduct at the “overstated culpability” end of the spectrum—due to the 
extensive police inducements offered and the defendant’s responses to 
those inducements—results in offense conduct for which the defendant 
should not be deemed as culpable for relative to other offenders, and 
which therefore should be excluded when calculating the ultimate 
sentence. 
1.     Facilitated Culpability 
To the left end of the spectrum are undercover police actions I label 
“facilitated culpability.” In this type of operation, the suspect is given “a 
government-provided opportunity to break the law,” the goal of which 
is “to encourage (or at least not to prevent) the commission of an 
offense.”152 These are often the simplest of undercover policing cases—
the undercover officer provides an opportunity, perhaps even several 
opportunities, to commit a crime but there are no additional 
inducements other than the bare opportunity itself. To the extent that 
undercover officers prolong or incentivize the opportunity, actions that 
fall at this end of the spectrum mirror “real-life” incentives and officers 
simply go along with the behavior and suggestions of the suspect.153 The 
 152 MARX, supra note 99, at 65. 
 153 For example, an undercover officer might try to negotiate a decrease in price for buying 
in bulk, but in a manner consistent with narcotics sales typically done in that region or 
neighborhood. See MARX, supra note 99, at 77–78 (discussing use of realistic temptations that 
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initial provision of the criminal opportunity could itself be termed an 
“inducement” (i.e. the offer of money in exchange for drugs).154 But if 
that offer is merely presenting a criminal opportunity or simply mirrors 
a realistic criminal opportunity, and the defendant willingly accepts that 
opportunity, that “inducement” does not affect an assessment of the 
relative culpability of the defendant. 
A clear example of police conduct that “facilitated culpability” is 
the single purchase of narcotics by an undercover officer on the street. 
The officer approaches a suspect who appears to be a narcotics seller 
and offers to buy an amount of drugs at the going market rate. The 
suspect willingly agrees and the transaction is completed. No additional 
persuasion or inducements are needed to complete the sale. Thus, the 
officer’s action—the inquiry to buy a particular amount of drugs—does 
not impact an assessment of a defendant’s culpability for the crime. 
More specifically, the police action does not suggest any decreased sense 
of the defendant’s culpability relative to other offenders. The defendant 
is culpable for the drug sale, regardless of the fact that it was prompted 
by an undercover officer. 
Cases in which the police make strategic choices based on quantity 
or other numerical amounts that ultimately impact a defendant’s 
sentence but utilize no additional inducements as to the commission of 
the crime also fall at the “facilitated culpability” end of the spectrum. 
Take the above example but add the factual wrinkle that the undercover 
officer deliberately offers to buy twenty-eight grams of crack cocaine 
instead of twenty-seven. The sale then takes place exactly as described 
above—willingly and with no additional encouragement by the officer. 
Although the officer’s tactical decision regarding quantity clearly 
impacts the defendant’s sentence,155 because no excessive inducements 
were used, the police conduct itself does not directly affect an 
assessment of the culpability of the defendant. If the defendant willingly 
sold twenty-eight grams, he is culpable for that conduct and should be 
sentenced accordingly.156 
are found in real-world settings). 
 154 But cf. McAdams, supra note 34, at 117 (“Inducement requires ‘something more’ than 
creating a mere opportunity for the defendant to commit the crime.”). 
 155 See USSG § 2D1.1(c)(7)–(8) (2010) (specifying that twenty-eight grams of cocaine base 
mandates a base offense level of twenty-six whereas twenty-seven grams of cocaine base carries 
a base offense level of twenty-four). 
 156 A critique of the police tactic to suggest a particular drug quantity is perhaps better 
understood as a critique of the quantity-based drug sentencing laws. Sentencing based on drug 
quantity is often criticized as unlinked to offender culpability. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, 
The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less Aggregation, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 901, 920–
21 (1991) (critiquing weight-based drug sentencing); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Assessing the 
Federal Sentencing Process: The Problem Is Uniformity, Not Disparity, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 833, 
854 (1992) (arguing that quantity-driven sentences in effect “mandate inequality”). If the 
police, however, propose a specific drug quantity accompanied by inducements which suggest 
that the suspect was not completely willing to deal in such quantities, then such inducements 
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An officer’s tactical decision to complete additional narcotics 
transactions rather than arrest the suspect after the first completed drug 
sale is another police action which—by itself—does not affect the 
assessment of a defendant’s culpability from the perspective of the 
sentencing manipulation doctrine. A common defense complaint is that 
instead of arresting the defendant immediately after the first drug sale, 
the undercover agent waited and completed additional drug buys before 
placing him under arrest.157 Like the decision to increase the quantity of 
narcotics, the police strategy of delaying arrest often dramatically 
increases the defendant’s sentence.158 Nevertheless, if the defendant was 
not induced in any additional way to commit the subsequent 
transactions (other than being presented with the realistic opportunity 
to make the additional buy), the police conduct at issue does not impact 
the determination that the defendant is fully culpable for his conduct. 
Although the police officers may, in deciding to carry out additional 
narcotics transactions, be taking advantage of quantity-based sentencing 
schemes, such strategic decisions are different than excessively inducing 
a defendant into committing an act he is not completely willing to do. 
The police conduct at issue here merely facilitates the defendant’s 
culpability—it does not affect the defendant’s volition in any way, thus 
not resulting in (or justifying) a decreased sense of the defendant’s 
culpability at sentencing relative to similar offenders.159 In the context of 
the sentencing manipulation claim, the police tactic to delay arrest in 
order to complete additional criminal transactions does not, in and of 
itself, move the police conduct beyond “facilitated culpability” 
conduct.160 
In sum, undercover police tactics that present a realistic 
opportunity to commit a crime and utilize no further inducements 
and the jump in quantity should be considered within the sentencing manipulation claim. 
 157 See, e.g., United States v. Sed, 601 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2010) (noting defendant’s 
argument that police unfairly “strung out their investigation”); United States v. Garcia, 79 F.3d 
74, 75 (7th Cir. 1996) (describing defendant’s argument as protesting government’s decision to 
continue to buy heroin from the defendant). 
 158 Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, the amount of narcotics sold in each 
transaction is totaled to determine the appropriate guideline and length of sentence. See USSG 
§ 2D1.1 cmt. n.7. This is also true of many state sentencing schemes. See, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. 
STAT. ANN. § 7508 (West 2003); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.112 (West 2009). 
 159 The same reasoning can be applied to the police decision to increase the amount of drugs 
negotiated in the second or subsequent sales. See, e.g., United States v. Appel, No. 95-10387, 
1996 WL 747899, at *1 (9th Cir. Dec. 3, 1996) (finding that the defendant, with no pressure 
from police, was the cause of the final larger sale of forty grams of LSD). 
 160 Similar to a critique of the police tactic of picking a particular drug quantity, a critique of 
the officers’ decision to delay arrest can also be understood as a critique of sentencing laws’ 
emphasis on cumulative drug quantity. See, e.g., United States v. Genao, 831 F. Supp. 246, 249 
(S.D.N.Y. 1993) (“[T]he fact that the total quantity of drugs chargeable to a particular 
defendant was distributed over a substantial period of time is a mitigating factor not adequately 
taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission.”); supra note 156. 
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comprise the “facilitated culpability” end of the spectrum. The mere 
suggestion of particular offense conduct by undercover police does not 
reduce a defendant’s ultimate culpability for all of the offense conduct 
willingly agreed to and committed. 
2.     Moving from Facilitated to Overstated Culpability 
The variable that causes police conduct to move along the 
continuum is the nature and extent of the inducements utilized by 
undercover police officers or their agents. “Providing an opportunity 
structure is one thing; trying to insure that it is taken advantage of is 
quite another.”161 Ultimately, consideration of a sentencing 
manipulation claim will also take into account the defendant’s actions in 
response to the police inducements, but the nature and extent of the 
police inducements are the starting focal points of the doctrinal inquiry. 
To illustrate the use of inducements within a particular police 
tactic, take the basic undercover tactic of leaving “bait.” A “bait car,” or 
“bait bicycle” or “bait laptop,”162 is an object used by police departments 
to capture thieves. These cars or objects often have internal surveillance 
and tracking devices, or are monitored via external surveillance. A bait 
item is placed in a location for the express purpose of having someone 
steal it. This police tactic is in essence “facilitative”—it is the provision 
of a mere opportunity to commit a crime. Ensuring that the bait bicycle 
has a certain monetary value in order to qualify as a felony theft,163 like 
the investigative decision to offer a particular quantity of drugs, does not 
automatically affect an assessment of a defendant’s culpability.164 
Inducements that tempt beyond the initial opportunity, however, are 
frequently used in these bait tactics; for example, in order to encourage 
 161 MARX, supra note 99, at 78. Marx goes on to state: “This is particularly important when 
our concern is with the causes of the behavior, rather than only with the technical matter of 
legal guilt.” Id. This is precisely the concern of a claim raised in the sentencing context as 
opposed to a trial phase claim. 
 162  See Bethany Braden, Misdemeanor Theft on the Rise, TENN. JOURNALIST, Nov. 23, 2010 
(describing a bait laptop program at the University of Tennessee); Kim Vallez, Bait Bicycle Nets 
Two Arrests, KRQE NEWS 13 (May 29, 2010, 11:28 AM), http://www.krqe.com/dpp/news/
crime/bait-bicycle-nets-two-arrests (describing Albuquerque Police Department’s operation 
leaving a bicycle worth $750 unsecured across from a store). The New York Police Department 
is exploring the usage of bait pill bottles. See Tom Hays, NYPD Looks to GPS Bottles to Combat 
Pill Bandits, MYFOXNY.COM, Jan. 15, 2013, http://www.myfoxny.com/story/20592464/nypd-
looks-to-gps-bottles-to-combat-pill-bandits.  
 163 See, e.g., The Bait, BAITBIKE, http://www.baitbike.com/the-bait/ (last visited Mar. 26, 
2013) (company that makes bicycles for police departments fitted with a tracking device and 
designed to exceed “the minimum dollar amount required for felony classification”). 
 164 One may, however, still have the related critique of how theft sentencing laws are 
structured and how the felonious nature of a theft is determined. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2016362
TINTO.34.4 (Do Not Delete) 4/19/2013 12:05 PM
1440 C A R D O ZO  L AW  R E V I E W [Vol. 34:1401
the theft, police officers leave the car ignition on, unlock the car doors 
or bicycle, or place enticing items in plain view.165 
As justified previously, the analytical focus of the sentencing 
doctrine has as its starting point the extent and nature of the 
inducements used. For it is the extent of the inducements utilized that is 
problematic from the perspective of assessing the relative 
blameworthiness of the defendant. As Gary Marx states, “[t]here is a 
profound difference between carrying out an investigation to determine 
whether a suspect is, in fact, breaking the law, and carrying it out to 
determine whether an individual can be induced to break the law.”166 In 
an attempt to illustrate inducements that may impact an assessment of a 
defendant’s culpability, consider the police tactic used by the New 
Orleans Police Department. In post-Hurricane Katrina New Orleans, 
the New Orleans police set up an undercover operation that placed food, 
cigarettes, and alcohol in an unlocked vehicle with its windows rolled 
down.167 This bait car was then placed across from a homeless 
encampment.168 Because they were inside a vehicle, theft of the food 
items constituted a felony burglary, a crime that carried up to twelve 
years in prison.169 In this example, the impact of police inducements on 
an assessment of a defendant’s culpability is fairly easy to ascertain. It is 
not difficult to envision a judge (if he had the discretion to do so) 
deeming a homeless person breaking into a car to steal food less 
culpable than a prototypical offender who commits an auto burglary 
and warrants a twelve-year sentence. As demonstrated above, the nature 
 165 See Bait Car Forum, POLICE FORUMS & LAW ENFORCEMENT FORUMS @ OFFICER.COM, 
http://forums.officer.com/forums/archive/index.php/t-150688.html (last updated Aug. 4, 2010) 
(forum posting comments by police officers describing various bait car operations including 
leaving doors unlocked, leaving windows halfway down with a purse in plain view, and putting 
$500 in the purse in order to be able to arrest for felony theft in addition to burglary); Jon 
Caramanica, The Monitor: ‘Bait Car’ on TruTV, L.A. TIMES, June 6, 2010, http://articles.
latimes.com/2010/jun/06/entertainment/la-ca-monitor-20100606 (describing bait tactics used 
by various police departments on a reality television show which included leaving bait vehicles 
abandoned after some ruse, like a false DUI arrest or a fight, and leaving the engine running 
and keys in the ignition); Allison Klein, Police Credit Use of Bait Car in Arrest of Break-In 
Suspect, WASH. POST, Mar. 8, 2008, at B02 (detailing tactics of D.C. police which included 
leaving a laptop computer and a cell phone in plain sight on the front seat of bait vehicle); Gary 
Taylor, Stealing ‘Bait’ Bike Could Net Man 10 Years in Prison, ORLANDO SENTINEL,  
Sept. 17, 2010, http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2010-09-17/news/os-bait-bike-conviction-
20100917_1_net-man-bike-expensive-bicycle (describing Daytona Beach Police’s actions of 
leaving an expensive bicycle unattended on a busy street corner with a purse attached to the 
handlebars). 
 166 Marx, Police Undercover Work, supra note 91, at 99; see also Dworkin, supra note 83, at 
24–27 (discussing how the use of various incentives by the police raises questions about the 
effect of these temptations on the defendant’s will and responsibility for the crime). 
 167 See Richard A. Webster, Commentary: Moving Target, NEW ORLEANS CITY BUS., Jul. 14, 
2008. 
 168 Id. 
 169 Id. 
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of the inducements used may influence an evaluation of the criminal 
culpability of the defendant. 
The listing of various inducements is not intended to suggest that 
the use of a particular inducement will, in and of itself, result in a 
decreased sense of a defendant’s culpability. Nor is it meant to 
categorize which inducements result in “facilitated culpability” as 
opposed to “overstated culpability.” Rather, claiming “the nature and 
extent of the inducements utilized” as the variable which moves police 
conduct along the continuum maintains a focus on the actions of the 
police and on the impact of inducements on a suspect’s willingness to 
commit a particular crime. 
3.     Overstated Culpability 
At the far end of the spectrum of police conduct are undercover 
actions that result in “overstated culpability.” This label suggests that, at 
some point, due to the amount or nature of the inducements utilized by 
the police and the defendant’s responses to those inducements, the 
defendant’s culpability will be, in effect, “overstated” and the mandatory 
sentence unjustified by an assessment of culpability.170 In other words, 
from the perspective of the offense conduct committed, the defendant 
appeared a very serious and blameworthy criminal (e.g. he possessed a 
machine gun; he transported a large quantity of drugs). However, upon 
an examination of why and how that offense conduct was committed, 
that is, when the extent of the inducements used is examined, a judge 
may—and I in fact suggest a judge should—find the defendant less 
culpable and reduce his sentence accordingly. 
Admittedly, the difficulty with a focus on the nature of the police 
inducements is that the analysis is necessarily fact-specific. The type of 
inducements that fall at this end of the spectrum run the gamut from a 
non-threatening question that turns aggressive by being repeated fifty 
times to a single intimation of harm. Moreover, as stated previously, 
determining the effect of the inducements on the defendant’s actions 
(and by proxy, on an assessment of the defendant’s blameworthiness) 
also involves an examination of the overall context of the transaction, 
the facts known to the police and their agents, the nature of the 
relationship between the defendant and the undercover officer, and the 
reactions and actions of the defendant. 
 170 A defendant who was induced in such a way would also likely raise an entrapment 
defense at trial or an outrageous government misconduct claim pretrial. These claims would 
likely fail due to a finding that the defendant was predisposed to commit the offense conduct or 
due to the defense’s inability to demonstrate government inducements “outrageous” enough or 
sufficient to tempt an innocent person. 
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Nevertheless, with the goal of providing some parameters for how 
and when police inducements may result in overstated culpability, this 
Section highlights several types of police tactics that serve as “red 
flags”—cases that carry a high risk that extensive inducements will be 
used. These categories of cases are ones that courts should examine 
closely for the use of inducements that rise to the level of impacting an 
assessment of the defendant’s culpability at the time of sentencing. 
a.     A Change in Transaction Type 
Cases that involve a change in the type or nature of the transaction 
that was led by the undercover officer or his agent are one type of 
undercover operation in which extensive or aggressive inducements are 
likely to be utilized. This category includes cases in which, rather than 
simply allowing the criminal transaction to proceed as negotiated, the 
undercover officer induces additional offense conduct of a different 
type—offense conduct that often carries a high mandatory sentence. 
Undercover operations in which the inducements change the crime 
from a (realistically) difficult crime to commit to an extremely easy one 
to commit are also included in this category. Inducements or 
temptations of this nature are often seen in narcotics operations given 
the extreme mandatory sentencing laws in the area of drugs and 
firearms.171 
Imagine the following hypothetical: Over a series of meetings, an 
undercover officer and a suspect negotiate a deal involving narcotics 
and handguns.172 At the very last meeting (the arrest is planned and is to 
 171 Under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2006), any person who is convicted of possession of a firearm 
in relation to a drug trafficking crime is sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of five years 
in prison and not less than a minimum of twenty-five years, served consecutively, for a second 
or subsequent conviction. Current law defines a “second or subsequent conviction” as 
including a finding of guilt and not simply a final judgment of conviction. See Deal v. United 
States, 508 U.S. 129, 132 (1993); see also, e.g., United States v. Washington, 301 F. Supp. 2d 
1306, 1308 (M.D. Ala. 2004) (sentencing defendant, with no prior criminal record, to the 
mandatory thirty years in prison because he pled guilty to possessing guns in connection with 
drugs on two different occasions in separate locations six days apart), aff’d, 122 F. App’x 986 
(11th Cir. 2004). Given this statute, there is a real incentive for undercover officers to introduce 
firearms into a drug sale if they want to expose the defendant to a higher mandatory sentence. 
For instance, an undercover agent who is selling drugs could inform the suspect he will only 
accept payment in guns. See, e.g., United States v. Luke-Sanchez, 483 F.3d 703, 704 (10th Cir. 
2007) (detailing how most of the methamphetamine was sold to undercover agents in cash but 
three-quarters of an ounce was exchanged for two pistols); United States v. Carreiro, 14 F. 
Supp. 2d 196, 198 (D.R.I. 1998) (noting that transaction between undercover officer and 
defendant initially involved only firearms but then officer required payment in money and 
narcotics). 
 172 This hypothetical is based on the facts of United States v. Cannon, 886 F. Supp. 705 
(D.N.D. 1995) (Cannon I), rev’d, 88 F.3d 1495 (8th Cir. 1996) (Cannon II). The district court 
found that there were grounds for reducing the defendant’s sentence based on the police 
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take place after the completion of the transaction), the undercover 
officer repeatedly and aggressively persuades the suspect to buy an 
unloaded machine gun, in addition to the narcotics and handguns. 
Under current federal law, the addition of a machine gun changes the 
nature of the criminal offense and has a dramatic effect on the suspect’s 
eventual sentence. Possession of a handgun dictates a mandatory 
minimum sentence of five years, but by accepting the machine gun, the 
suspect now faces a mandatory additional and consecutive twenty-five 
years in prison.173 
Other undercover police actions that change the type of the 
criminal transaction include inducing a defendant to change, mid-
transaction, to a different form of a narcotic. Due to the sentencing laws’ 
punishment of some narcotics more harshly than others, the change to a 
different form of narcotic may signal that the undercover officer used 
extensive inducements to ensure the suspect’s agreement.174 In addition, 
undercover officers may use inducements that are more tempting than 
real-world opportunities or other extreme enticements to such an extent 
that the very nature of the transaction is transformed; for example, from 
a high-stakes criminal act to a very easy mission to complete.175 In 
United States v. Martinez-Villegas, for instance, the government agents 
offered an extremely good payment to the defendants in exchange for 
transporting a large quantity of narcotics and invented a simple 
transportation route that was easy to complete.176 The district court 
noted that, “as the risks were minimal, and the money substantial, it is 
not surprising that the [defendants] accepted the government’s offer.”177 
conduct. Id. at 709. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed based on the finding of an unrelated 
prosecutorial error. Cannon II, 88 F.3d at 1503. Although the Eighth Circuit did not address the 
lower court’s sentencing decision explicitly, it suggested its disapproval, stating that the officers’ 
conduct was not “outrageous” nor violated the defendant’s due process rights. Id. at 1507–08. 
 173 In Cannon, if the transaction had involved only the handguns, the defendant would have 
faced a mandatory minimum sentence of five years. See Cannon I, 886 F. Supp. at 707. The 
addition of the machine gun increased the mandatory minimum to thirty years. Id. 
 174 See, e.g., United States v. Searcy, 233 F.3d 1096, 1100–01 (8th Cir. 2000) (finding that the 
informant induced the defendant to switch from selling powder cocaine to crack cocaine), 
vacated on appeal after remand, 284 F.3d 938 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding that the defendant did 
not meet his burden to prove sentencing entrapment); United States v. Shepherd, 857 F. Supp. 
105, 110–11 (D.D.C. 1994) (finding sentencing manipulation based on undercover officer’s 
insistence that the defendant convert the powder cocaine to crack cocaine before he would 
purchase it), rev’d, 102 F.3d 558, 566–67 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that prior circuit law 
mandates that the mere request to change powder cocaine to crack cocaine is insufficient to 
demonstrate sentencing manipulation). 
 175 See, e.g., United States v. Berg, 178 F.3d 976, 984 (8th Cir. 1999) (Bright, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that sentencing manipulation occurred because the DEA supplied a hard-to-get 
chemical needed to make methamphetamine and purposefully put it in the purest form in order 
to maximize the defendant’s sentence); United States v. Cromitie, 781 F. Supp. 2d 211, 221 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (noting that the Government provided all the materials for the terrorist plot 
including cars, a gun, and the explosive devices). 
 176 993 F. Supp. 766, 774 (C.D. Cal. 1998). 
 177 Id. 
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The government controlled the negotiations, thus ensuring that the 
defendants would “easily accept and undertake a relatively simple task 
for an extraordinarily high fee.”178 Due to these inducements and the 
“unwarranted pressure” placed on the defendants, the court found that 
the defendants should not be sentenced on the basis of all the narcotics 
transported.179 
The key to my claim that the above police conduct results in 
“overstated culpability” is the use of aggressive encouragement or 
extensive inducements that led the suspects to agree to the desired 
offense conduct—namely the possession of the machine gun or the 
transportation of an extremely large quantity of drugs. It is of course 
possible to imagine a case in which the undercover officer offers a 
machine gun and the suspect willingly and excitedly agrees (and 
therefore “overstated culpability” is not a concern). My aim in 
suggesting these examples is to highlight the fact that, due to sentencing 
laws in these areas and law enforcement’s own incentives to ensure that 
suspects agree to the desired offense conduct,180 inducements which 
impact an assessment of the defendant’s culpability are likely to be used 
in this category of police actions. 
b.     The Reverse Sting 
Another type of police action that carries the risk of “overstated 
culpability” is the undercover policing tactic of a reverse sting. A reverse 
sting is an undercover operation in which the police or their agents pose 
as the seller of an item, such as narcotics or weapons, and they recruit a 
suspect to be the buyer.181 In a reverse sting, the police—as the seller, 
supplier, or provider of the criminal opportunity—create and ultimately 
 178 Id. at 774, 776. 
 179 Id. at 777. 
 180 The decision to induce additional offense conduct of a different type is linked to officers’ 
incentives to increase sentences generally. Although difficult to prove empirically, scholars and 
researchers generally agree that there are institutional and personal incentives for officers to 
seek longer sentences for arrested suspects. See JAMES Q. WILSON, VARIETIES OF POLICE 
BEHAVIOR 12, 137 (1978) (describing findings from qualitative study of law enforcement 
practices in eight communities and noting officers’ general desire to have a tough penalty 
imposed); Alan F. Arcuri, Police Perceptions of Plea Bargaining: A Preliminary Inquiry, 1 J. 
POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 93 (1973) (describing the negative attitudes of police officers toward plea 
bargaining in part because they wanted defendants to receive longer sentences); see also, e.g., 
Dale G. Parent, What Did the United States Sentencing Commission Miss?, 101 YALE L.J. 1773, 
1787 (1992) (noting that police groups vigorously lobbied the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines 
Commission to make sentences more severe for their “favorite” crimes); sources cited supra 
note 69 (describing cases in which the officer admitted purposefully trying to increase the 
suspect’s sentence). 
 181 This is in contrast to a “buy and bust” operation in which an undercover officer poses as 
the buyer of the contraband. 
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dictate the terms of the transaction. As defined by the Sentencing 
Commission, a reverse sting in the context of a narcotics transaction is 
“an operation in which a government agent sells or negotiates to sell a 
controlled substance to a defendant.”182 In a reverse sting, there is 
greater potential for the police to manipulate the quantity of the 
narcotics in order to maximize a defendant’s sentence because the 
government, as the seller, controls the transaction.183 The police have 
complete discretion to set the price and amount of contraband 
delivered. This discretion allows the police to use inducements such as a 
below-market rate sales price and set other terms that do not mirror real 
life transactions. Such inducements may “transform a defendant who is 
a small dealer into a more substantial one, without regard to the 
defendant’s proclivities.”184 
The facts underlying the case of United States v. Naranjo provide 
an illuminating example.185 A confidential informant, working for the 
Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), told agents that Lorenzo Naranjo 
had been trafficking cocaine for many years.186 But when the informant, 
at the DEA’s urging, tried to get Naranjo to sell cocaine to him, Naranjo 
repeatedly and consistently refused.187 The DEA then decided to change 
the operation into a reverse sting (thus making the government the 
seller) and told the informant to convince Naranjo to buy ten to twenty 
kilograms of cocaine.188 The informant was not able to persuade 
Naranjo to purchase even a lesser amount of five to ten kilograms.189 
The DEA then instructed the informant to arrange for Naranjo to meet 
with the “seller,” in actuality an undercover DEA agent.190 The 
undercover agent repeatedly stressed that he wanted to sell Naranjo five 
kilograms of cocaine.191 Eventually, in order to complete a sale of five 
kilograms (an amount guaranteeing a mandatory minimum sentence), 
the undercover agent “agreed” to accept payment for only two 
kilograms and to “front” the other three.192 
 182 USSG § 2D1.1 cmt. n.14. 
 183 See United States v. Caban, 173 F.3d 89, 93 (2d Cir. 1999) (“It is unsettling that in this 
type of reverse sting, the government has a greater than usual ability to influence a defendant’s 
ultimate Guidelines level and sentence.”). 
 184 United States v. Lora, 129 F. Supp. 2d 77, 80 (D. Mass. 2001); see also United States v. 
Goodwin, 594 F.3d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“Manipulation of this sort effectively decouples drug 
quantity from culpability. . . .”). 
 185 52 F.3d 245 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 186 Id. at 246. 
 187 Id. (describing how the informant called Naranjo almost forty times and each time 
Naranjo said “no”). 
 188 Id. 
 189 Id. 
 190 Id. 
 191 Id. 
 192 Id. at 247. Upon these facts, the district court found that there were no grounds for a 
reduction in sentence. Id. at 251. The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, stating that “[o]ur 
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As seen by this example, the use of inducements in a reverse sting 
may result in a defendant committing offense conduct for which he may 
not be as blameworthy, compared to other offenders who commit the 
same level of narcotic crime, since it is unlikely that the defendant 
would have committed such conduct had he not been so induced.193 As 
previously mentioned, the Sentencing Commission explicitly recognizes 
the possibility of a downward departure in the narrow instance of a 
reverse sting in which the government acts as the narcotics seller.194 The 
same concerns that motivated the Sentencing Commission to provide 
for a reduction in sentence for this particular type of reverse sting 
operation also apply to reverse stings more generally. For one, much of 
the police conduct discussed in the previous Section—extensive 
inducements resulting in a change in the type of criminal transaction—
occurred in the context of a reverse sting operation.195 Because the 
police control the terms of the transaction, they are thereby able to at 
first suggest—and later insist on—the addition of a gun or a different 
form of narcotic in order to complete the transaction. Like the reverse 
stings targeted by the Sentencing Commission, reverse stings in general 
carry a high risk of the manipulation of sentences through the use of 
problematic inducements.196 
c.     The Fictional Stash House 
A third type of police tactic that serves as a red flag for the use of 
extensive inducements—and which appears to be increasingly used by 
law enforcement but has had little, if any, analytic scrutiny—is the 
fictional stash house operation.197 A “stash house” is a location, often a 
reading of the record strongly suggests that Naranjo had neither the intent nor the resources to 
engage in a five-kilogram cocaine transaction.” Id. at 250–51. 
 193 For instance, Naranjo may have only purchased two kilograms of cocaine had he not 
been offered the other three kilograms essentially for free. 
 194 See supra text accompanying note 146. 
 195 See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Villegas, 993 F. Supp. 766, 774 (C.D. Cal. 1998); 
United States v. Cannon, 886 F. Supp. 705, 708 (D.N.D. 1995), rev’d, 88 F.3d 1495 (8th Cir. 
1996). Because the reverse sting tactic in these cases did not involve government manipulation 
of drug price or quantity, they did not fall under the ambit of application note 14 of the U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines. 
 196 See United States v. Caban, 173 F.3d 89, 94 (2d Cir. 1999) (“We invite the Sentencing 
Commission’s attention to some more comprehensive measure that would consider what 
happens when a reverse sting involves a theft in which the government sets the bait (rather than 
a purchase in which the government sets the price).”). 
 197 Personal interviews with practicing attorneys and an informal survey of court cases and 
mass media articles suggest the increased use of this tactic by law enforcement agencies. Law 
enforcement agencies that use this technique include the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms 
and Explosives (ATF), the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), and local police departments in 
the following jurisdictions: New York; Chicago; Fairfax County, Virginia; Alexandria; 
Baltimore; Atlanta; Miami; Houston; Austin; Shreveport; Las Vegas; Tucson; Santa Ana; Los 
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residential house or warehouse, where drugs, money, and other 
trafficking-related items such as firearms are kept until moved to 
another location. A fictional stash house operation is one in which an 
undercover officer, or an informant working with the police, recruits 
one or more suspects to rob a location where drug dealers allegedly keep 
large amounts of drugs and possibly money and weapons.198 
The fictional stash house is completely imagined. The officers or 
informant create all the details of the stash house, including the quantity 
of drugs and money being held. In addition, because the stash house is 
entirely imaginary, the police invent other critical details that help entice 
the suspects, for example, telling the suspects how many people will be 
guarding the stash house, whether it is necessary for the suspect to be 
armed, and the degree of danger involved or risk of the occurrence of 
other crimes. Over the course of one or more meetings, the undercover 
officers or their agents meet with the suspects to discuss the robbery of 
the stash house. Once the suspects agree to commit the offense conduct, 
they are arrested, typically either at a meeting or in a vehicle, supposedly 
on their way to commit the “robbery.” Defendants captured in a 
fictional stash house operation face charges of conspiracy and attempt 
to distribute narcotics, as well as various weapons and other drug 
offenses.199 
In fictional stash house operations, the potential for the use of 
extensive inducements and unrealistic temptations comes to the 
forefront. In these operations, the police have “virtually unfettered 
ability” to effectively guarantee a high sentence for the defendant and to 
say and do whatever is needed to ensure the suspect’s participation.200 In 
a typical undercover drug operation, the government is theoretically 
constrained by realistic market rates and amounts. By contrast, in a 
fictional stash house operation, the police are less bound by typical or 
realistic quantities given the target’s nature as a storage facility. 
Undercover operatives often pick an amount of narcotics that will 
trigger the mandatory minimum sentencing laws.201 Suspects are often 
Angeles; and Tacoma. For a case involving the stash-house tactic, see United States v. Lewis, 
641 F.3d 773, 777 (7th Cir. 2011) (referring to fictional stash house technique as “what’s fast 
becoming a rather shopworn scenario in this court”). 
 198 See, e.g., United States v. Sardinas, 386 F. App’x 927, 929 (11th Cir. 2010) (describing 
how an undercover police officer posed as a disgruntled drug dealer who wanted help in 
robbing one of his employer’s stash houses); Steven Kreytak, Undercover Operation Nets Men 
Accused of Agreeing to Rob Drug Houses, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN (Sept. 4, 2010), 
http://www.statesman.com/news/local/undercover-operation-nets-men-accused-of-agreeing-
to-898157.html (detailing recent stash house operation by ATF). 
 199 For example, the defendants caught in a stash house sting created by the New York Drug 
Enforcement Task Force were convicted of conspiracy, the attempt to possess cocaine with 
intent to distribute, and the use of a firearm during a drug trafficking crime. See Caban, 173 
F.3d at 90. 
 200 United States v. Briggs, 623 F.3d 724, 729 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 201 See, e.g., Caban, 173 F.3d at 93 (“It is unsettling that in this type of reverse sting, the 
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encouraged to bring items, such as guns, zip ties, or duct tape, that will 
not only serve as evidence of their intent to participate in the 
conspiracy, but will also allow the charging of additional crimes.202 The 
police, by dictating how the proceeds of the robbery will be divided, can 
effectively set a below-market purchase price.203 In addition, the 
government can “minimize the obstacles that a defendant must 
overcome to obtain the drugs.”204 For example, the police can convince a 
suspect that the stash house robbery would be a shockingly simple and 
easy crime to commit and can provide items, such as a car, needed to 
complete the crime.205 
The underlying facts of United States v. Diaz exemplify the use of 
extensive inducements within the fictional stash house technique.206 
Agents from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives 
(ATF) and officers of the Tucson Police Department initially focused on 
suspects Diaz and Urrea based on a tip from a confidential informant.207 
Prior to their arrest in this case, Diaz, eighteen years old, and Urrea, 
thirty-seven years old, had very little criminal history.208 The court 
noted that the evidence suggested that Diaz’s and Urrea’s statements 
about their capability to complete a stash house robbery were 
exaggerations and in fact it was unlikely they had ever committed a 
similar crime in the past.209 Over two meetings, the undercover agents 
“set out most of the details for the proposed invasion and theft,” 
government has a greater than usual ability to influence a defendant’s ultimate Guidelines level 
and sentence. It appears to be no coincidence that the [police] chose to place no less than 50 
kilograms of . . . cocaine in the warehouse.”). 
 202 See, e.g., Statement of Facts and Memorandum of P. & A. in Support of Motions for 
Defendant at 1, United States v. Johnson, No. 3:10-CR-03507-W (S.D. Cal. May 2, 2011) 
(noting that defendant in a stash house case faced charges of conspiracy to possess with intent 
to distribute cocaine, conspiracy to affect commerce by robbery and extortion, possession of a 
firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, and felon in possession of a firearm and 
ammunition). The nature of a conspiracy charge itself creates expansive possibilities for stash 
house operations to result in additional charges. See Dru Stevenson, Entrapment and the 
Problem of Deterring Police Misconduct, 37 CONN. L. REV. 67, 105 (2004) (discussing how 
conspiracy laws create new opportunities to use sting operations). 
 203 See, e.g., United States v. Cambrelen, 29 F. Supp. 2d 120, 125 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (finding 
that the informant offered defendants their share of stash house narcotics far below the market 
rate). 
 204 Briggs, 623 F.3d at 730. 
 205 See, e.g., United States v. Spentz, 653 F.3d 815, 817 (9th Cir. 2011) (stating that an ATF 
agent told the suspects that two and a half million dollars’ worth of cocaine was guarded by two 
men, only one of whom was armed); United States v. Sistrunk, 622 F.3d 1328, 1334 (11th Cir. 
2010) (noting defendant’s argument that undercover agents told him that the drugs were 
guarded by two or three older men with only one firearm); United States v. Williams, 547 F.3d 
1187, 1193 (9th Cir. 2008) (describing an ATF agent’s statement to the defendants that the stash 
house would only be guarded by one man with a sawed off shotgun and two women who 
counted the money). 
 206 No. CR 09-284-TUC-RCC (CRP), 2010 US DIST. LEXIS 134027 (D. Ariz. Dec. 2, 2010). 
 207 Id. at *3. 
 208 Id. at *22. 
 209 Id. at *19–22. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2016362
TINTO.34.4 (Do Not Delete) 4/19/2013 12:05 PM
2013] U N D E R CO V E R  PO L I C I N G 1449
including that there were at least two thousand pounds of marijuana 
and that it was guarded only by two men with guns and two other 
“nerds.”210 The agents did “a significant amount of the talking and 
planning” and supplied the cargo van needed for the robbery.211 
An additional aspect of fictional stash house operations linked to 
the use of inducements is the frequent involvement of confidential 
informants. The risks of using informants in undercover policing 
generally are well documented.212 Informants have strong incentives to 
create a criminal transaction. In exchange for arranging and assisting in 
the completion of crimes, informants are often paid money by the 
government or receive assistance from the police in their own criminal 
case.213 Informants may have a particular incentive to encourage 
criminal transactions to become larger in scope or greater in number.214 
These motivations similarly incentivize the use of inducements in order 
to ensure the completion of a criminal transaction and credit to the 
informant. Indeed, informants might use persuasion tactics that law 
enforcement officers would not.215 
 210 Id. at *4–5. 
 211 Id. at *17–18. 
 212 See ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, SNITCHING: CRIMINAL INFORMANTS AND THE EROSION OF 
AMERICAN JUSTICE 69–81 (2009) (discussing incentives for informants to lie, law enforcement’s 
dependence on informants, and the lack of systemic oversight); Hay, supra note 24, at 407 
(stating that when police use informants in undercover operations, it is particularly likely that 
the operation will not reveal whether the suspect would truly have committed this crime 
without police involvement); Wachtel, supra note 1, at 141–42 (discussing and listing 
sociological studies which document informant misconduct during investigations). 
 213 See, e.g., NATAPOFF, supra note 212, at 32, 47; Hay, supra note 24, at 407; Clifford S. 
Zimmerman, Toward a New Vision of Informants: A History of Abuses and Suggestions for 
Reform, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 81, 100–02 (1994) (documenting various benefits received by 
informants); Adrienne Packer, Targets of Police Sting Call Operation Unfair, LAS VEGAS REV.-J. 
(Jan. 25, 2009), http://www.lvrj.com/news/38291804.html (describing how informant was 
arrested in an armed robbery after he became a paid informant but continued working as an 
informant on ATF stash house operations to “work off his charges”); see also Kreytak, supra 
note 198 (detailing informant’s Facebook posting after finishing a stash house operation which 
read “Crime is up. Crime pays”). 
 214 See United States v. Parker, 376 F. App’x 1, 7 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (describing 
informant’s pay of $50 per day for involvement in stash house undercover operation and 
“reward” of $2,500 because the investigation was successful); Memorandum of P. & A. in 
Support of Defendant’s Motions in Limine at 2, United States v. Warren, 3:10-CR-03507-002-
W (S.D. Cal. Jul. 11, 2011) (stating informant indicated he “has worked at nothing but setting 
up fictitious stash house robbery busts” for over three years and received money, housing, and 
food for his work); Sandra Guerra, The New Sentencing Entrapment and Sentence Manipulation 
Defenses, 7 FED. SENT’G REP. 181, 182 (1995) (discussing informants’ incentives to engage drug 
dealers in large transactions in order to reap more leniency or more money). 
 215 See United States v. Lora, 129 F. Supp. 2d 77, 96 (D. Mass. 2001) (“The informants used a 
troubling tactic: They used [defendant’s] debt to a large Colombian trafficking organization to 
play upon his fear of retaliation.”); United States v. Martinez-Villegas, 993 F. Supp. 766, 769 
(C.D. Cal. 1998) (noting that informant tried repeatedly, both in person and on the telephone, 
to get defendant to contact the undercover agent); see also supra note 187 and accompanying 
text (discussing tactics of informant in the Naranjo case). 
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Although the risks of using informants inhere in essentially all 
undercover operations in which they take part, the risk of informants 
using extensive and problematic inducements is particularly great in 
fictional stash house operations because the government—and by proxy 
the informant—often controls all of the aggravating aspects of the 
alleged offense. It is often left in the hands of the informant to make 
sure that the suspects agree to the various terms of the transaction. 
Informants may invent the quantity of drugs to be robbed as well as 
serve as the “co-conspirator” who gives the encouragement needed to 
ensure the suspects’ participation.216 Informants may also be the ones to 
identify the suspect or suspects interested in committing the robbery.217 
Again, given the nature of informants and their incentives, how they 
recruit and identify suspects to participate in the stash house operation 
and how they present that “recruit” to the government is potentially 
very troublesome.218 Considering that not all interactions with suspects 
are recorded, the use of informants is even more worrisome when 
envisioning how courts would consider the role of inducements during 
sentencing.219 
Fictional stash house cases are reverse sting operations in which the 
government and their informants set the bait. Given the many criminal 
charges that can result from how the stash house operation is portrayed, 
 216 See, e.g., United States v. Oliveras, 359 F. App’x 257, 260 n.4 (2d Cir. 2010) (noting that 
the amount of narcotics was increased by the confidential source); United States v. Staufer, 38 
F.3d 1103, 1105 (9th Cir. 1994) (describing how informant convinced the defendant, his 
acquaintance of many years, to sell a large amount of LSD in part because the defendant had 
serious financial difficulties and had recently been robbed, beaten, and hospitalized); United 
States v. Cambrelen, 29 F. Supp. 2d 120, 125–26 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (finding it troubling that 
informants influence the stated drug quantity because informants are often facing their own 
drug cases and have large incentives to inflate the drug quantities in the cases they help 
investigate). 
 217 See, e.g., United States v. Sardinas, 386 F. App’x 927, 929–30 (11th Cir. 2010) (describing 
how confidential informant introduced the undercover agent to people interested in robbing a 
stash house); United States v. Corson, 579 F.3d 804, 806 (7th Cir. 2009) (noting that ATF agents 
met with a confidential informant who then identified the defendants as people who may be 
interested in robbing a drug stash house). 
 218 Law enforcement’s position that these are individuals who in fact have either committed 
similar crimes in the past or are truly willing and able to commit such a crime if presented with 
the opportunity in the real world is often uncorroborated. See, e.g., United States v. McKenzie, 
656 F.3d 688, 692 (7th Cir. 2011) (“The crime proposed was, in the district judge’s words, a 
‘massive’ one; it is somewhat baffling, then, that the young men who the authorities recruited 
did not have ‘massive’ criminal histories to match.”); United States v. Diaz, No. CR 09-284-
TUC-RCC (CRP), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134027, at *22 (D. Ariz. Dec. 2, 2010) (noting concern 
that government relied on an unclear and unreliable informant to identify, without 
corroboration, suspects allegedly actively involved in stash house robberies). 
 219 See Parker, 376 F. App’x at 8 (noting that conversations between informant and 
defendant in stash house operation were not recorded); Packer, supra note 213 (stating that 
ATF disposed of recordings they believed were irrelevant). It is also important to remember 
that the recordings themselves are not foolproof or perfect evidence. See MARX, supra note 99, 
at 135–36 (discussing how tapes can contain omissions, can be selectively used, and are 
manipulated by techniques of scripting and criminalizing). 
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the potential augmentation of a defendant’s criminal liability is often 
greater than that of a typical drug deal. Correspondingly, the risk that 
extensive inducements are used to ensure the suspect’s participation is 
even greater. The inducements used to persuade suspects to commit, or 
simply to agree to commit, a serious and severely sentenced set of crimes 
elicits significant questions regarding the extent of the defendants’ 
blameworthiness and the possibility that the mandatory sentence will be 
disproportional to any determination of culpability.220 
d.     No-Knowledge Conduct 
A final category of police conduct that may result in “overstated 
culpability” is comprised of operations in which the police direct the 
defendant to unknowingly commit offense conduct that mandates an 
increase in sentence. For example, the suspect, at the behest of the 
police, unwittingly conducts a drug sale in a school zone or, 
unbeknownst to the suspect, the police pass him a purer form of 
narcotics.221 In United States v. Ciszkowski, a confidential informant, 
working under the direction of the DEA, arranged to give narcotics and 
a pistol to the defendant.222 At the time of the transaction, the informant 
passed the defendant a closed bag containing a firearm with a silencer.223 
There was no evidence to suggest that the defendant had asked for a 
silencer or that he even knew he had been given one.224 Due to his 
acceptance and possession of a firearm with a silencer, the defendant 
faced a mandatory additional twenty-five year sentence.225 
 220 See United States v. Briggs, 397 F. App’x 329, 333 (9th Cir. 2010) (stating that “we 
recognize that ‘reverse-sting operations’ like the [fictional stash house] in this case may risk 
overstating a defendant’s culpability”). The court in Diaz concluded that it “should treat these 
Defendants for who they really are, not for who the Government wishes they were.” Diaz, 2010 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134027, at *23. The court, however, denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss 
based on “outrageous” police conduct and stated that sentencing was the appropriate place to 
address the alleged manipulation. Id. 
 221 See, e.g., United States v. Eads, 191 F.3d 1206, 1212 (10th Cir. 1999) (describing 
defendant’s argument that the government, without his knowledge, purposely provided him 
with a sufficient percentage of pure methamphetamine to mandate a life sentence); Graham v. 
State, 608 So. 2d 123, 124 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (stating that the officer selected the 
apartment location in a school zone as well as the late night transaction time). 
 222 492 F.3d 1264, 1267 (11th Cir. 2007). 
 223 Id. Both the gun and the silencer were supplied by the government. Id. at 1271. 
 224 The defendant was arrested immediately after accepting the bag. Id. at 1267. At trial, an 
ATF agent testified that a layperson would not be able to tell just by looking at the firearm that 
a silencer was mounted to the interior. Id. 
 225 Id. The Eleventh Circuit declined to find sentencing manipulation, stating that the police 
conduct was not “sufficiently reprehensible.” Id. at 1271. The court stated that because the 
defendant agreed to accept a gun to complete a murder, “[i]t is conceivable that the 
government could reasonably decide that a muzzled firearm is the appropriate weapon for the 
commission of a murder for hire and then provide [the defendant] with such a weapon.” Id. 
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In the context of evaluating police actions and their impact on an 
assessment of a defendant’s culpability, this type of police conduct 
stands in sharp relief. In these cases, the defendants do nothing to 
suggest they are morally culpable for the government-planted offense 
conduct, since in fact they are not even aware that they are committing 
the conduct. This type of case, therefore, is on the extreme end of the 
“overstated culpability” side of the continuum. The police conduct 
unquestionably “overstates” the defendant’s culpability and results in an 
unjustified lengthy sentence.226 While not an example of the use of 
extensive inducements by law enforcement per se, the police conduct in 
these cases falls within a broader understanding of manipulative police 
action that impacts an assessment of the defendant’s culpability and 
blameworthiness at sentencing, and therefore should also be included 
within the scope of the sentencing manipulation doctrine. 
* * * 
In sum, it bears repeating that the labels of “facilitated culpability” 
and “overstated culpability” are not stringent, binary categories.227 The 
 226 This type of police conduct is included within the ambit of the sentencing manipulation 
doctrine precisely because it is the police who are directing the transaction. See supra Part II.A. 
If a suspect unwittingly committed such offense conduct in the “real world” (without police 
participation), he would certainly bear the risk and resulting brunt of sentencing—there are 
typically no scienter requirements for these types of sentencing enhancements. For instance, the 
defendant need not know he is distributing drugs in a school zone in order to have his sentence 
increased for doing so. See 21 U.S.C. § 860 (2006) (school zone enhancement for narcotic 
offenses); United States v. Haynes, 881 F.2d 586, 590–91 (8th Cir. 1989). With respect to 
whether the defendant needs to have knowledge of the characteristics of the weapon under 
§ 924(c), the courts of appeals are divided. The First, Sixth, Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits 
have held that the defendant need not have knowledge as to the particular features of the 
weapon. See United States v. Burwell, 690 F.3d 500 (D.C. Cir. 2012); United States v. Mojica-
Baez, 229 F.3d 292 (1st Cir. 2000); United States v. Benner, 188 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 1999); United 
States v. Gilliam, 167 F.3d 628, 638 (D.C. Cir. 1999); United States v. Shea, 150 F.3d 44, 52 (1st 
Cir. 1998), abrogated on other grounds as recognized in United States v. Vasquez-Castro, 640 
F.3d 19 (1st Cir. 2011); United States v. Crawford, 91 F.3d 155 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. 
Brantley, 68 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 1995). 
These “strict liability” sentencing enhancements are subject to a more general culpability-
based critique whether undercover police officers are involved or not. Yet when it is the 
government supplying the “unknown” strict liability element, there is a direct relationship 
between the officers’ conduct and an assessment of the defendant’s culpability, and 
consequently, this police conduct should be of concern to the sentencing manipulation 
doctrine. 
 227 There is, admittedly, a blurry line between inducements that result in the overstatement 
of a defendant’s culpability and those that merely facilitate it. It is particularly blurry if one 
accepts my argument that there can be no particular level or amount of police “misconduct” 
required. While pointing out more extreme examples at the far ends of the spectrum, I 
acknowledge that courts will face many more close calls in the middle when evaluating the 
impact of the inducements used. But courts are competent to make such individualized factual 
assessments; indeed, historically, that was exactly the practice and point of providing judicial 
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tactics discussed above are examples of conduct along the continuum 
but should not be taken to suggest that a particular police strategy will 
have the same impact on an assessment of a defendant’s culpability 
every single time it is used. Rather, the cited tactics highlight when it is 
likely that extensive and troubling inducements are used—inducements 
that may result in a less severe assessment of a defendant’s culpability at 
sentencing. It is possible of course, for the sake of argument, to pose a 
hypothetical of each tactic that would fall at the opposite end of the 
spectrum. For instance, while simply extending a narcotics transaction 
to include two deals may be more “facilitative,” if the police aggressively 
induce a suspect to make a huge change in the quantity of drugs 
exchanged, that could result in “overstated culpability.” Similarly, there 
could be a stash house operation in which it is clear that the 
demonstration of the suspects’ culpability is merely facilitated and no 
additional inducements were used other than the initial opportunity to 
commit the crime. Viewing police conduct along on this continuum 
does demonstrate, however, how current versions of the sentencing 
manipulation doctrine fail to provide for a sentence reduction even 
when merited. Broadly defining sentencing manipulation as any 
improper police conduct that impacts a defendant’s sentence fails to 
provide any sense of what makes police conduct “improper.” On the 
other hand, a definition strict in its applicability may fail to provide the 
necessary relief when an assessment of a defendant’s culpability is in fact 
impacted by police inducements. My aim in proposing this spectrum of 
police conduct is not to identify finite categories or a checklist of 
inducements but rather to suggest a way to approach the application of 
my proposed sentencing manipulation doctrine and the determination 
of when and what police conduct impacts an assessment of a 
defendant’s relative culpability. 
CONCLUSION 
The criminal justice system is founded on the principle of just 
punishment. While undercover policing is a necessary part of that same 
system, concerns of what Judge Friendly termed “government-induced 
criminality”228 must temper a rush to view all suspects caught in 
undercover police operations as equally blameworthy, despite perhaps 
being equally guilty of the substantive offense.229 In contrast to the 
discretion in sentencing. 
 228 United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670, 677 (2d Cir. 1973). 
 229 See Memorandum from Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr. to All Federal Prosecutors 
(May 19, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/oip/holder-memo-charging-sentencing.pdf 
(“[E]qual justice depends on individualized justice, and smart law enforcement demands it.”). 
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black-white dichotomy of innocence versus guilt forced in a trial phase 
claim, a sentencing doctrine should enable the culpability of offenders to 
be viewed in shades of grey. A reformulated sentencing manipulation 
doctrine acknowledges this goal and balances our interest in accurately 
and justly punishing criminal offenders with the important role law 
enforcement has in catching these offenders in the first place. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2016362
